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PREFACE
Disraeli, Gladstone, Chamberlain, Carnarvon
Kimberly, Shepstone, and Prere
A aation*s pplioy, whether it be foreign, colonial, or
domestic, is determined by the interests of that country with
due consideration of existing circumstances. The carrying out
of this policy, however, is delegated to one man or to a group
of men. The rigor and exactitude with which the policy is
executed is dependent upon the political sagacity, natural a-
bility and personal attitude of the man or men to whom this
responsibility is intrusted. Herein lies the purpose of this
thesis, which is a study of the attitudes of seven British
statesmen4 Disraeli, Gladstone, Chamberlain, Carnarvon, Kimberly,
Shepstone, and ^’rere, in regard to the colonial policy of England
in South Africa from 1875 to 1895.
In a general way, -England’s Colonial ambitions are well
known. "The sun never sets on English soil", because when
treaties are being signed the Britishers make no bid for European
territory but are quite content to pick up choiee bits of land
scattered all over the globe. The sentimentalist would say that
England is merely assuming her share of "the white man*s burden".
The materialist would not deny this entirely, but would quietly
realize that England was also deeply interested in the profitable
business of feathering her nest with gold.
England in her relations with South Africa has been moti¬
vated by economic desires and political ambitions. In the case
I
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of certain individuals however, this motive was modified by
an abhorrence of the brutality and cruelty which was the in¬
evitable result of the unchecked eaqjloitation of the Natives,
The question then arises as to what extent the sentiment and
action of these individuals Influenced the course of events
in South Africa,
While there has been a vast amount of material written
about South Africa, none of it deals with the attitudes of the
people involved except in an incidental manner. It was on the
asstimption that men's attitudes determine their actions, that
this thesis was written.
Historical Background of The British In South Africa 1814-1875
Introduction
It is generally accepted that the Phoenicians sent out in
€»10 B. C., by King Necho, Pharaoh of ^gypt, were the first ex¬
plorers to ciro\»Bnavigate Africa and to set eyes upon the Cape
of Good Hope*^ But South Africa did not come within the sphere
of the ancient civilizations; not even the reputed wealth of
Zimbabwe was sufficient to bring this about. It did become, how¬
ever, the haven of the Hottentots who were being pushed southward
p
by their stronger brothers, the Bantu.
After an interval of nearly nineteen hundred years, "For
the glory of God and the profit of Portugal”, Prince Henry the
Navigator, set himself to the gigantic task of finding a water
route to India and carrying Christianity to the people he met
on the way. !fhe Portuguese found this road to India and set
up colonies on both the west and east coasts of the s outhem
portion of Africa. These colonies, however, were little more
than trading posts and "stations” on the voyage to the more im¬
portant IndiaSebastian III, King of Portugal, 1552-1578, at-
1. J. Scott Keltie, The Partition of Africa. (Lmdon, 1895), p. 8.
2. W. M. MacMillan, The Cape Colbug Question ■/(London, 1927) p. 27.
3. (Jeorge M»Call Theal, The Portuguese in South Africa (Capetown,
1896), p. 80,
4. Ibid., pp. 81-152, passim.
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tempted to reassert Portuguese power in Africa, His death in
1578 and the annexation of Portugal by Spain, whose interests
lay in the west, hastened the decline of the Portuguese Empire
in Africa,®
The real business of colonizing South Africa was left to
the Dutch xander whose flag on April 6, 1652, the three ships,
** Goede Hoop, Dromedaris and Reiger** dropped anchor in Table
Bay, The next day. Van Riebeeck set his feet on the "terre
firma" of South Africa to begin the history of Cape Colony,®
Like practically all the other colonies founded in the seven¬
teenth and early eighteenth centuries. Cape Colony owed its
existence to a private company, composed of, and financed by,
private citizens. This company, the Dutch East India Company,
made a spirited and conscientious effort to develop its project in
in South Africa into a remxinerative one. For a time it seemed
as if it would succeed. In 1688 several hundred Huguenots,flee¬
ing from the Catholic wrath of Louis XIV, settled at the Cape,
Although they were a great asset to the colony, the company
soon fell into a period of grievous mismanagement from which it
never recovered. Finally, when faced with a total deficit of
X150,000, the great Dutch iiiast Indian Company bowed to the in¬
evitable, and in 178S paid its last dividend although its offi-
7
cial death was delayed until 1798,
5, Eric A, Walker, History of South Africa (London, 1928),
p, 24,
6, Ibid., pp, 31, 32,7,Ibid., pp. 130-164, passim
¥
In the meantime events were happening in JSurope which
were to have results in South Africa, Following the French
Revolution, iiingland, in her bloody wars against French Lib¬
eralism, did not fail to do a bit of "land grabbing". England
occupied Cape Colony from September, 1795, to February, 1803,
8
and again in 1806, The occupation was made permanent in 1815*
Through the influence of Sir George Grey, Governor of Cape Colony
from 1854 to 1862, Natal and the Cape were given representative
governments*
At best the problem of governing such^heterogeneous popu¬
lation as that of South Africa was a difficult one. Moreover
on this occasion England showed none of that nattiral ability to
govern of which English writers are prone to boast. On the
other hand, from the very beginning England opposed the merci¬
less exploitation of the Natives. This of coixrse made the Heme
Q
Government exceedingly unpopular with the Boers, whose whole
economic structure depended upon such exploitation.
In 1834 the Kaffirs had made a determined stand against
Dutch and British encroachment. In spite of great bravery they
were defeated in 1835; their land was taken and they became
British subjects. But the agreement made by Sir Benjamin D'TJrban,
Governor of Cape Colony, failed to get the approval of the Home
Government. The Kaffirs were given back their land and their
8. Ibid«, pp. 130-164, passim.
9, This is the term generally applied to South African Dutch.
freedom.^® This action on the part of the English ministry
had been the immediate cause of the Great Trek. In 1846 and
1851 assaults were again made on the Kaffirs by both Boers
and English, who at this time were able to retain their spoils.
By the settlement of these wars the territory now known as
Kaffraria was added to the British Empire
Meanwhile, Dutchmen who resented the British emancipa¬
tion of slavery and other British actions in behalf of the
Natives,-*- were fotmding the Orange Free State and the South
African Republic, which by 1864 included all the Dutch settle-
13
ments nCrih-^OB the Vaal, Largely through the efforts of John
Brand its president for several terms, the Orange Free State
maintained friendly relations with the Cape Government for
thirty years. Actually, however, conditions were far from be¬
ing friendly. Custom houses v/ere maintained on every frontier
and the commercial relations of Cape Colony, Natal, South African
Republic, and the Orange Free State, each trying to prosper at the
expense of the other, were at times strained to the point of
la
breaking.'^*
10. William Harrison Woodward, A Short History of the Expansion
of the British Empire ISOO-TOSO, CCambridge. England, 1931),
pp. 2§0^2dl.
11. Loc. cit.
12. C. J. Tfys, In the Era of Shepstone , (Lovedale. South Africa,
1953), pp. 24-64, passim.
15. Norman Dwight Harris, Burppe and Africa (^hiB^go, 1928), p. 190.
14. Ibid.. p. 191.
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In 1857, Lord George Grey proposed and urgently advocated
a union of the three states. Gape Colony, Natal, and Orange Free
state into a Federal Government with a representative Congress,
a responsible cabinet and an appointive Governor to replace the
15
high commission. But neither the pleas of the Cape nor the
eloquence of •^ord Grey could prevail against the conservative
policy of the Home Government which politely refused his i)eti-
tion.
But by 1871, the discovery of diamonds in the 5ransva41
and Griqualand had caused the British Government to experience
a change of heart. Sir Henry Bark]gr,f , Governor of Cape Colony
and High Commissioner ffom 1871 to 1877, asked the Home Govern¬
ment if it would take the question of forming a union of South
17
Africa under advisement. Lord Kimberley, Secretary for the
Colonies, favored it. The office of the Cape Commissioner was
flooded with petitions from English colonists to annex the
diamond lands. The territory in question was claimed dry the
Transvaal Republic and also by Waterboer,a watlve chief. Barkly
with the knowledge and consent of the Colonial Office, success¬
fully championed Waterboer's cause. Then, much to the discom¬
fort of President Pretorius and his Transvaalers, Great Britain
15. Loc. C it •
16. Uys, Shepstone, pp. 38-39.
17. Walker, South Africa, pp. 344-345.
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annexed the territory under the name of Grlqualand West* It
was this bit of territory which proved to be the basis for
19
Chamberlain's change of attitude in his South African Policy.
Before entering into this study, however, there is one
factor which should be pointed out since it is absolutely essen¬
tial to the understanding of the problem which faced and still
is facing the governing power of South Africa. This is the at¬
titude of the Boer and also the English capitalists toward the
Natives. While the butch were ready to fight and die for
"liberty** and all that the word implies, they were equally
zealous of retaining those privileges for themselves. The Dutch
denied to the Watives the political and economic rights which
they themselves enjoyed. The British, while they had no love for
the Native, desired to give him some of the opportunities which
all the whites enjoyed. Herein lay the conflict between Boer and
Briton. If there had been no wegroids or colored people in South
Africa there would have been no problem.
18. This assertion is developed at length by William Miller
MacMillan in his two books; Bantu Boer and Britji^ftn^ The
Making of the South African Native~]Problems^ (London.
) a"]^ ^e Cape Colour Question, A Historical Survey;
(London, idS^/). See also j^dgar H!. Brookes. The Colour
]^oblems of South Africa^ (London, 1934).
19. See infra.. Chapter IV^ P*45.
CHAPTER I
Benjamin Disraeli
Benjamin Disraeli, who formulated the early British
policy in South Africa, was a Jew, His grandsire, an
Italian Jew, had come to London in 1746 and had amassed a
respectable fortune through speculation in the stock ex¬
change, His father, Isaac Disraeli, much to the disappoint¬
ment of the elder Disraeli, turned out to bo a compiler of
anecdotes rather than a business man. On his marriage early
in 1802, Isaac Disraeli took an apartment at "#6, King*s
Road Bedford Row, and there at half-past five in the morning
of Friday, December 21, 1804, or according to the Jewish
1
reckoning, the 19th of Tebet -5565 his eldest son, Benjamin
had been bom.
The father exercised a profound influence on the son.
The father, a scholarly recluse, passed on this tendency to
his son who, only by exercise of will power, kept it in sub¬
ordination, According to Benjamin Disraeli himself, he as¬
signed to his father a foremost place among the few from
whose wisdom he had drawn profit, and to the end of his days
he was never weary of paying homage to his father*s genius
2
and attainments.
Perhaps the most Important trait of character with which
this thesis is concerned is the fact that Isaac Disraeli in
1, J, A, Proude, Lord Beaconsfield j(Now York, 1890), pp, 6-13,




spite of beinig a Jew and being wedded to a Jewess, "had
not a single passion or prejudice: all his convictions
were the result of his own studies, and were often opposed
to the impressions which he had early imbibed".® He not
only never entered into the politics of the day, but he
could never understand them. He was never connected with
any body or particular group of men, nor with any partic¬
ular political thought, theory or faction. He recognized
the existence of race prejudice but looked upon it as one
of the follies of mankind which time alone would eradi¬
cate
Under the shadow of such a character aa this,
Benjamin Disraeli, the future Prime Minister, spent the
early and most formative years of his life. This perhaps
helps to explain how, as Prime Minister, he could consider
so impartially and dispassionately the Bulgarian atrocities
and the Zulu uprising, and in each Instance attempt to pursue
the pojicy which would be of the greatest benefit to Her
Majesty’s welfare.
At the age of six the future statesman was sent to a
school kept by Miss Roper, Prom this he passed to one of
higher grade kept by the Rev. John Potticany. While there,
after the death of the grandfather, Benjamin Disraeli,
Isaac Disraeli had his son baptised into the Christian Church
of England. IVith the change of religion a change of schools
5, William P. Monypenny and George E, Buckle, The Life of
Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield^ (New York, l'5^9)^




v/as advisable. Young Disraeli was sent to Dr. Gogan's School
from which he was expelled for besting in physical combat the
school bully,®
He entered Into the speculation market and failed. The
failure was repeated in an attempt to set up a newspaper,®
In order to forget as well as to give London time to forget
his failures Disraeli took a trip through Spain, North Africa,
and the Orient,*^ Upon his return to London Disraeli made a
de3-iberate and -well planned entry into society in order to
gain political alms. Through his friend, Lytton Bulv/er, he
met Lord Lyndhurst and Mrs. Wyndham Lewis. The former was
the Conservative leader, the latter was the lady whom he
later married. At first Disraeli flirted with both Vi/higs and
Tories, then, realizing that this policy could not get the
desired results, he oast his lot with the Conservatives,
After continual failures at Wycombie, where lie thought him¬
self well known and esteemed, he was elected from Maidstone
which he had never seen until a week previous to the elec¬
tion,®
Disraeli’s long and hard climb to power was marked by
his developing some very definite ideas of government policy.
5, Proude, Beaconsfleld, pp, 13-17,
6, Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli, I, 59-60, 77,
7, Brandes, Beaoonsfield, pp. 88-104, passim.
8, Andre Maurois, Disraeli. A Picture of the Victorian Age,
(New York, 1930), pp, 97-115, passim.
4
His viev/s on foreign policy may perhpas be summarised thus;
"The preservation of peace, guaranteed mainly by a steady
understanding with Prance, the strict observance of treaty
obligations; the avoidance of intermeddling in the domestic
affairs of other nations, and especially of stirring up dis¬
order in other countries under the specious pretext of pro¬
moting liberal institutions; the discouragement of sentimen¬
tal politics, based on the idea of nationality, which tends
to alter the existing boundaries of states, or on Jacobin
notions which he regarded as being subversive of all the es¬
tablished and traditional order. In short, the maintenance
unmodified of British interests and British prestige with a
due respect to the rights and interests of other nations."^
Since Disraeli had such a strong belief in race and
the existence of differences in race^®, it may seem strange
that he had so little faith in nationality. He realized
that there was some connection between the two ideas, but
he also maintained that there was a difference between them.
According to Disraeli, "Nationality is the miracle of pol¬
itical independence. Race is the principle of physical
analogy". He further pointed out that "while race depends
on blood, nationality is more often merely a matter of local¬
ity",Buckle suggests in this connection that "to a Jew9,Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli, I, 1002-1004,
10, Anonymous, The Political Adventures of Lord Beaconsifeld ^
(New York, between 1874 and 1880), pp,“V-48, passim,
11, Moneypenny and Buckle, Disraeli. I, 1005.
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nationality could never make so pov/erful appeal as race."^^
This, at least in part, explains Disraeli’s attitude toward
the assertion of nationalities. For it must be remembered
that he was fundamentally as well as politically a Conserv¬
ative •
As regards eolonial policy Disraeli made the follow¬
ing important declaration before Parliament in 1850:
"if there be any object which, more than another, ought
to engage the attention of the statesmen of this country, it
is the necessity of consolidating our Colonial Empire. If we
wish to maintain our political power or our commercial wealth,
we can only secure those great results by the consolidation
of our Colonial Empire. I will not advert to the political
means by which such a consolidation might be maintained, I
will not enter into the difficult but important consideration,
whether the Colonies ought or ought not to be represented in
this House—altJiough these are questions which we ought not
to discard from our minds—but looking only to the commerbial
and fiscal part of the subject, I cannot understand by what
means in the present day, following the current of our recent
legislation, that consolidation might take place unless we
can reduce into a fact a phrase which political economists
are so fond of using—namely, that our Colonies should be
placed on the same footing as the counties of England. Now
let me ask the House, when this claim has been made on be¬
half of the Colonies, what has been the objection? It has
always been met by the plea that it is impossible the Col¬
onies can have the same footing as our English counties, be¬
cause they do not bear their share of the excise duties.
But in attempting the great commercial and fiscal reforms
which have gone on for the last six or seven years, if you
had directed your attention to the Excise, instead of the
Customs, you would have articles of consumption, and dim¬
inished in a great degree the burdens of the people, while
at the same time we should have destroyed the great barrier
to that consolidation of our Colonial Empire; and, while we
relieved and employed our people, v/e should have increased
the imperial strength of this still, I hope, great Empire,
11. Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli, I, 1003.
12. Loc, clt,
13. Ibid., I, 535.
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Again in 1872 Disraeli made a profession of his col¬
onial views in Parliament.
“It has been proved to all of ns ^e declare^that we
have lost money by our Colonies, It has been shown with pre¬
cise, with niathenmtioal demonstration, that there never was a
jewel in the Crown of England that was so truly costly as the
possession of India, How often has it been suggested that we
should at once emancipate ourselves from this incubus I Well,
that result was nearly accomplished. ?/hen those subtle views
were adopted by the country under the plausible plea of graft¬
ing self-government to the Colonies, I confess that I myself
thought that the tie was broken. Not that I for one object to
self-government; I cannot conceive how our distant Colonies
can have their affairs administered except by self-government.
But self-government, in my opinion, when it was con¬
ceded as part of a great policy of Imperial consolidation. It
ought to have been accompanied by the institution of some rep¬
resentative council in the metropolis, which would have brought
the Colonies into constant and continuous relations with the
Horae Government, All this, however, was omitted because those
who advised that polloy--and I believe their convictions were
sincere--looked upon the Colonies of England, looked even upon
our connection with India, as a burden upon this country; by
those moral and political considerations which make nations
great, and by the influence of which alone men are distinguished
from animals,
Well, what has been the result of this attempt during the
reign of Liberalism for the disintegration of the Empire? It
has entirely failed. But how has it failed? Through the sym¬
pathy of the Colonies for the Mother Country. They have de¬
cided that the Empire shall not be destroyed; and who neglects
any opportunity of reconstructing as much as possible our Col¬
onial Empire, and of responding to those distant sympathies
which may become the source of incalculable strength and hap¬
piness to this land,"^^
In 1874 Disraeli became Prime Minister and in 1876 he
became Lord Beaconsfleid. It was, not until 1879 that
Lord Beaconsfleid came into direct and personal contact with
the South African problem. He had originally selected as
secretary of state for the Colonies the one man among the
14, Monypenny & Buckle, Disraeli, II, 1069
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Conservativ©'leaders who had made a continuous study of col¬
onial problems; v/hos© views moreover coincided with the con¬
solidating and unifying policy which he himself had advocated
in 1850 and again in 1872, This man was Lord Carnarvon.
Carnarvon, who had made a reputation for himself by carrying
through the great act for the Confederation of Canada in
1866-67, desired, upon his return to office in the Beaoonsfield
Cabinet, to consolidate South Africa into a unified British de¬
pendency. In the progressing of his idea Carnarvon had been
encouraged by his chief. Lord Beaoonsfield, as v/ell as by his
predecessor in office. Lord Kimberley. The latter had observed
that "South Africa, ov/lng to the Native peril, was ripe"^^
for measures of consolidation.
Armed with these assurances Carnarvon proceeded with
high hopes for the success of his Confederation project. He
proposed a conference of the representatives of the South African
colonies to meet in London to discuss the proposed Confederation,
However, he made the diplomatic error of suggesting the names of
the men who were to be sent to the conference,^® The Cape Colony
took umbrage at this move, which it considered an abrogation of
its rights as a political unit. Moreover, it was held that the
movement for confederation should begin in South Africa and not
in London, The conference proposal was abandoned. But
15. Ibid., II, 1282.
16, Reginald Ivan Lovell, The Struggle for South Africa
(New York, 1934), p. 13. —.
Lord Carnarvon sent his friend, J. A, Proude, the eminent his¬
torian, to South Africa on a semi-official mission which had
for its purpose the molding of opinion in favor of confeder¬
ation. This Proude mission was regarded with some reserve if
not downright distaste hy Beaconsfield, who referred to it as
a blunder, and who lost some of his confidence in Carnarvon
because of it.^*^
Lord Carnarvon soon realized that Proude's picture of
an enthusiastic and unanimous South Africa backing the col¬
onial office against the responsible government at Capetovm
was not altogether unexaggerated. He therefore dropped his
original proposal and extended a new invitation to a confer¬
ence in London. This conference, however, attracted only a
negligible attendance and did not materially advance confed¬
eration.^® The Dutch went on maintaining their rather comic
independence through even the most severe and military econ¬
omic vicissitudes. Lord Carnarvon, then evidently decided to
await the failure of the Dutch Republic before launching his
confederation scheme again.An opportunity presented it¬
self, he thought, in the general unrest of 1876.
The Internal anarchy of the Dutch Republic had for some
time been a scandal throughout South Africa. Moreover, it
was constantly threatening and generally fighting one of the
17. Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli. II, 1284.
18. D. C. Somervell, Disraeli and Gladstone. A Duo-Biograph¬
ical Sketch^(Hew 'fork, 1S2'6), p. ^lO.
19. Walker, South Africa, pp. 367-368.
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other of its colored neighbors who detested the Boers for
their harsh and cruel treatment of the Natives, Two chief¬
tains in the North, Khama and Lobengula, implored the pro-
PO
tection of Queen Victoria against Boer aggression. Mean¬
while Getyv/a\30, the King of the formidable fighting tribe
of Zulus, was restrained from attacking his barbarous en¬
emies only by the British authbrlties in Natal, In the summer
of 1876 the Boers prodded Sikukuni, a chieftain who, like
Khama and Lobengula, owed allegiance to Cetjnvayo, into war.
He defeated the Boers but became exasperated because of the
employment of the Dutch of bands of ruthless and savage
"Scoundrels'',^^ The Native population thus becoming the sub¬
jects of murder, rape, and rapine, was thrown into a danger¬
ously excited state, and there was fear in the minds of those
v/hites who kne\v the situation best, such as Barkly, and
Shepstone, of a general Kaffir War, Carnarvon shared this
fear, but at the same time, he saw, as he thought, a real op¬
portunity of pushing for'.vard, in spite of recent rebuffs, his
great panacea of federation, "My hope", he wrote to Beaconsfield
on September 15, "is that by acting at once, v/e may prevent war
and acquire at a stroke the whole of the Transvaal Republic,
after which the Orange Free State will follow, and the whole
policy of South Africa for which we have been labouring, will
be fully and completely justified,"^^
20, Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli. II, 1285,
21, Loc, cit,22,Ibid.. II, 1286
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Here again Beaconsfield, though a strong believer in
federation for South Africa appears to have had his doubts
as to the wisdom of this forward policy of his undersecret¬
ary; but evidently his mind was too much taken up with the
Eastern Question in that autumn of 1876 to give serious thought
prt
to South Africa. At .any rate he trusted his colleague’s ex¬
pert Icnowledge and accepted his proposals. On April 6, 1877,
he wrote to him; "I approve of the Bill; Indeed I don't see
that v/e have any other course to take. . . Paul Kruger is an
ugly customer,Later, in the House of Lords, Beaconsfield
defended the annexation as having been a geographical neces¬
sity" •
In his letters to Carnarvon and his speeches to Parlia¬
ment Beaconsfield seemed to base his South African Policy
completel^/^ and entirely on political expediency and economic
advantages. There is no evidence to show that the Native
problem influenced him in the least. The fact that "with
their nalced bodies a defenseless people were attempting to
protect their hearths and ho'mes"^^ from the Dutch meant nothing
at all to Beaconsfield, Not once did he allude to Dutch aggres¬
sion in Native territory, or Dutch abrogation of Native rights,
or the wholesale murders of the Natives by the Dutch, or the
"harsh treatment" of the Natives by both the Dutch and the Eng¬
lish, One finds not so much as the slightest intimation that
23. William L. Danger, European Alliances and Alignments
1870-1890 (New York, 1931), pp, 7^-117, passim,
24. John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone (New York,
1921),III, 417“
25. Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli. II 1285
-11
iiii was eVeii 6©rib^3:*n<S& witk §h.ej^-&iilv«»4al - lack-of esgard for
Satire rights«
To think that the Prime Minister did not know of these
conditions is to underestimate vastly the intelligence of the
man. It is far more reasonable to suppose that he was of the
opinion that Native interests should bo subordinated to those
of white men.^® This being the case, the welfare of the
Natives did not enter into his consideration of colonial policy
for South Africa, The only question he sought c : answer was
27
as to what course would be the most advantageous to England,
Beaconsfield*s lack of personal interest in South Africa
gave an unusual amount of power to the colonial secretary, who
now went forv/ard with confederation with renewed vigor, and
who eventually brought on war. Sir Theophilus Shepstone whom
Garvarvon sent out v/ith "cllscretioaapy powers” to annex the
Transvaal did so in 1877, Until then the English had always
protested against the maltreatment of the Natives by the
Dutch, but now that the Dutch Republic had been annexed to the
English Grown, Englishmen joined with Boers in oppressing the
Natives, Whereas the English had (unofficially) sided with
the Zulus against the Boers, they were themselves now arrayed
in solid phalanx against the ZulusGetywayo probably real-
26, Lovell, South Africa^p, 6,
27, Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli.II, 1282-1322, passim,
28, Walker, South Africa^p, 383,
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ized full well that he could not successfully fight the Boers
and the British nation hut he probably also realized that to
give up without a fight would be to depart from the tradition¬
al courage of the great Zulu tribe. In utter desperation he
accepted Prere’s challenge^® and the Zulu war commenced in
spite of the fact that the Home Office did not desire it.
There could be but one ending for such a one-sided v/ar. After
a few initial successes the Zulus, in spite of their unbounded
courage, were defeated by the British v/ith their vast super¬
iority in numbers, equipment, and resources,^®
The v/ar inconvenienced the Government, for it came at
a time when Beaconsfield had boen occupied with affairs else¬
where. He had, therefore, expressly advised Sir Bartle Prere
against war at that time. Since Sir Bartle had thought other¬
wise, Beaconsfield had censured him. He did not, however, re¬
call hlm.^^ Buckle explains this by pointing out that while
Beaconsfield was fully in accord with the policy carried out
by Prere the censure was necessary for the reason that Prere
had proceeded contrary to instructions from the Home Office.
In the defense of his stand in this matter the Prime Minister
declared in the House of Lords: "We had but one object in
view, and that was to take care that at this most critical
29. Infra ,, Chapter pp. 72-74.
30. Walker, 'South.Africa, p. 384*
31. D. C. Somervell, Disraeli and Gladstone, p. 212.
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period the affairs of Her Majesty in South Africa should he
directed by one not only qualified to direct them but who
was superior to any other individual whom we tolght hav* s«-
32
leetad for- the purpose
Again a glimpse of Beaconsfield's attitude toward the
South African policy of the government is caught as he de¬
clares that his feelings and beliefs were the same as they
had always been, and that Lord Carnarvon had selected Prere
to carry out a policy of confederation but not of annex¬
ation, Beaconsfield then made one of his few references to
the Natives, He pointed out that the Transvaal had been an¬
nexed because the circumstances were "peculiar"; that it
had become a territory which was no longer defended by its
occupiers. But while he trusted that the defeat of the
Zulus would shortly be accomplished in a significant manner,
he altogether disclaimed any intention either of extermin¬
ating them or annexing their country,^^ Was Disraeli prompted
by any consideration other than governmental expediency?
This was no time to annex a troublesome territory, if for
no other reason than the heavy expense. On the other hand,
it might have been that he honestly had no desire deliber¬
ately to appropriate to the English throne territory to which
England had no right whatsoever. His biographers do not con¬
sider this question, at all. For the present, at least until
32, Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli, II, 1299,
33, Loc, cit.
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more information is gleaned. Lord Beaconsfield's personal
34
opinion must remain a closed chapter*
The end of the Zulu War came as sweet music to the ears
of the Premier who immediately wrote to the Queen from:
”10 Downing Street, July 24, 1879
• • • The news from Zulu land, with the long-
awaited sunshine filled everyone with sanguine
hopes, ... It has fallen to Lord Beaconsfield’s
lot thrice to advise Your Majesty on the ques¬
tion of peace or war and thrice it has been de¬
cided for the latter; but neither Abyssinia nor
Your Majesty’s arms. These wars have been brief,
and complete, and successful. Your Majesty threw
down your glaive in the Levant but it was not taken
up. . . .”35
At the close of the Parliamentary session in early August
there was a warm discussion in the cabinet on the method of
meeting the expenses of the Zulu war. Beaconsfield was de¬
termined not to increase taxes at a time of distress and bad
trade in order to pay for a war into which the Government had
•z ^
been forced against its will by its agent. Against the op¬
position of his cabinet, he considered that it was sufficient
that half of the additional military expenditure of those
34, E. T. Raymond, Disraeli: Alien Patrolt (N. Y., 1925), p. 7,
35, Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli. II, 1319-,
36, The financial distress and bad trade to which Beaconsfield
alludes was due in part to military operations in other parts
of the Empire, India in particular. Moreover there was a
general unrest in Europe due to Bismarck's activity and fear
of a war. In England Itself in the fall of 1879 harvests were
being wiped out by floods,. These aspects are discussed brief¬
ly in Andre Maurols, Disraeli, pp. 335-345,
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troubled years should be provided out of taxation*
As in all other instances Beaconsfield, from all the
evidence on the subject, seems to have remained entirely
"unmoral”. His opinions, personal feelings, and attitudes
due to character or race or environment, seem to have been,
in this instance, either non-existent or kept under the per¬
fect control of a political mind* Beaconsfield was an ego¬
tist, a worshiper of titles, ceremony, and aristocracy; more¬
over, he loved to occupy the center of the stage. Perhaps
it is these qualities which explain the fact that throughout
his long political career he never expressed an opinion that
would have the slightest chance of becoming a political wea¬
pon in the hands of enemies.
In conclusion, however, it would be only fair to Beacons¬
field to remember that he took very little part in the de¬
cisions that shaped the affairs of South Africa from 1875-1895*
His was only a permissive will: both the planning and the
carrying^ of “^outh African Policy was done by the Secretary
for the Colonies, who, according to Beaconsfield*s own words,
was the man best equipped to pursue successfully a triumphal
and glorious colonial policy*
37. Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli, II, 1319*
CHAPTER II
dadstone
William ^art Gladstone upon irhoOi fell tlie problem
of South Africa policy after Ihsraell left office, was bom
December 29, 1809* His father and mother were both Scotch.^
The father, John Gladstone, who came from a long line of sue-
cessful merchants, and tho had amassed an enviable fortune from
his several commercial ventures—not the least of which were
O
several sugar plantations in Jamaica, British West Indies ,
was a hard and exacting man of indomitable will, having hard
and fast ideas as to what he wanted his son to be and do«^
The senior Gladstone was, at heart, an aristocrat cund a de«
voutly religious man; however, his Christ-like principles
did not extend to fair treatment of the slaves on the sugar
A
plantations »
!• Frank Wakelev Gunsalas. William Ewax^ Gladstone .(Chicapco.
1898), p. 20. ~ ■ ^
2. John Clark, Ridpath, Life and Times of William E. Gladstone.
(Hew York, 1898;, p. ^5.
3. Gunsaulas, Gladstone, p. 21.
4. On one of Join Gladstone's plantations in Demerara (Since
1831, British Guiana) there was a slave uprising in 1823
idiich spread throu^out the colony. The re^llion was put
down with "great cruelty, • • » negroes £^10 wore torn in
pietes by the lash of the cart whip". life of a white
smn. Rev* John Smith, was sacrificed Iri^^tburst of "race
passion". The incident is briefly described in Morley,
Gladstone. I, 22. A more detailed account is given in




Pram the very beginning John Gladstone had political
ambitions for his son and to an extent for himself* It is
very probable that political aspirations played a large part
in his close friendship with George Canning,® Tory M*P# for
Liverpooli% ^o was an almost constant visitor at the Gladstone
home**^ In later years, speaking of the Influence of Canning,
Gladstone said, "I was bred under the shadow of the great name
of Canning; every Influence connected with that name governed
the policies of my childhood and my youth”*® Ho became a
devoted disciple of Canning's domestic and foreign policy* In
lamenting the death of the object of his early hero-worship he
concluded, ”Lest we diould give to man the honour due to God—
lest we should exalt the object of our admiration Into a divin¬
ity for our worship—He who calls the weary and the mourner to
eternal rest hath been pleased to remove him from our eyes*"^
Since Canning played such an Important part in the fcman-
ative period of Gladstone's life, it will be profitable to ex¬
amine the attitude idilch this great statesman held in regard
5* Ridpath, Gladstone, p* 34*
6* George Canning succeeded Gastlerea^ as Foreign Secretary
in 1822, and in 1827 became Prime Minister#
7* After giving much material support to Canning for six years,
John Gladstone was elected frcmi the borough of Lancaster to
sit in the Parliament of 1818*
8* Morley, Gladstone. I, 25*
9* George Barnett Smith, The Life of the Right Honourable
William Ewart Gladstone^(New York, 1880), p* 22*
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to foreign policy, colonial policy, slavery, and the Negro*
On May 15, 1823, Canning, representing the Government, pro¬
posed resolutions in Parliament looking toward the gradual
amelioration of the treatment of slaves, but discountenancing
abolition*^® In his first message as Foreign Secretary he
communicated with Secretai>y of State Adams, requesting that
”any British subject who defied the law and dishonored his
country by engaging in a trade of blood sho Id be detested and
brought to justice *even by foreign hordes and under the pro-
n 11
tection of her flag* ", But the strong Southern element in
the Senate proved too strong for Adams; the proposal was
"modified” to the extent that Canning v/as forced to refuse to
12
accept it*
On the other hand, while it is true that "there was no
question to which Canning attached more importance than the
Slave Trade",it is also true that ho had no exalted idea
of the Negro as a man. His humanitarlanism extended only to
the amelioration of human suffering. This attitude is evident
in a speech made in Parliament in 1823 in which Canning des¬
cribed the Negro as a being with the form of a man and the in¬
tellect of a child. "To turn him loose in the manhood of his
10, Lowell Joseph Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the
British Caribbean* 1763^-1833 XNsw York, 1^2'67, p.'41?5^
11, Henry Wilson, Rise• and Fall of the Slave Power in America
(Boston, 1872)', 1, l08.
12, Loo. Cit,
13, Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning (London,
1925), p, 495.
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physical stren^h. In the maturity of his physical passions,
hut In the Infancy of his uninstructed reason, would he to
raise up a creature resemhling the splendid fiction of a re¬
cent romance".^
This concise view of Mr* Canning's attitude toward the
Negro, slavery and the slave trade explains how he could he
an active and conscientious men&>er of the ’^African Institution"
w|dbeh had for its object the obtaining of "truthful information
16
about the Africans and to distribute it, • • •" This, then,
was the type of man upon whose ideals OAadstone admittedly
built his own. However it can not be forgotten that the father,
who was a devout believer in and a stout advocate of "the sacred
institution of slavery"^® and jrho even took his fight against
the abolition of slavery to Parliament, also exerted a powerful
influence over the thinking of Gladstone.
The influence of the father was the stronger on the ques¬
tion of slavery, for throu^out the whole momentous struggle
the son was in full accord with the father, and denounced the
Whig Reform Bill of 1832.Though he grew into an extremely
religious man, and engaged in much discussion and writing on
14. Morley. Gladstone. I. 26. Fremkensteln is the rcmiance to
which Canning alludes*
15. Charles H. Wesley, "Emancipation in Great Britain 1808-1823",
Journal of Negro History. XYII, (April, 1934), 163.
16. Morley, GladAto^jO. I, 22-25.
17. George W. E. Russell, The Rifdit Honourable William Ewart
Gladstone , (Hew York, 1^91), p. 2TZ
theological subjects, there is no evidence that he ever be¬
lieved in equal opportunity for the Negro* It is but natural,
then, that such a philosophy as this would play an important
part in his colonial policy of South Africa*
In 1828, after six years at Eton, Gladstone entered the
“steeped and stolid Toryism of Oxford”* He received his
Bachelor's degree January 26, 1832* At Oxford Gladstone gained
1A
his first experience in practical politics, and acquired that
deep interest in relgion that followed him throu^out life*
Through the Influence of the Duke of Newcastle Gladstone
became a member of Parliament for the borough of Newark in the
opening session of 1833* The very first question in which he
engaged was that of the apprenticeship of Negroes in tiie West
Indies. Reports received from the colonies indicated that in
some of them and particularly in Jamaicatbe apprenticeship
system had led to harsher treatment of Negroes than they had
suffered under slavery* A committee of which Gladstone was a
member was appointed to investigate the complaints from
Jamaica*^® With the memory of his slave-owning father fresh
in his mind, and with the realization that his family's wealth
had come primarily from the unpaid labor of black slaves, and
having accepted Canning's belief in the inferiority of the
Negro, '^^laaitAhe zeal^aly- upheld the apprenticeship system
18* His fiery but scholarly speeches condemning the Reform Bill
were made during this period, and were well received*
19* Morley, Gladstone. I, 145*
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and defended the planters* On March 30, 1838, he spoke
eloquently for two hours in defense of the system* In con¬
clusion he expressed “his joy that the day had at last ar¬
rived when he could meet the charges made against the planters
and enter upon their defense”*^®
On the other hand Gladstone’s views on colonial policy—
in relation to white colonists—seem to have been qtiite liber¬
al* He believed that the root of the connection between mother
country and colony lay in "the affection of the colonists for
the land from which they sprang, and their spontaneous desire
■"
21
to reproduce its laws and the spirit of its Ihstitutibfti,
Gladstone advocated applying the principles of the
Sermon on the Mount in dealing with foreign nations and with
colonies: law, justice, and the "Rights of man" should pre¬
vail and be recognized*. He moreover believed that British
statesmen shoiald seek to promote peace, should further the
cause of nationality and political liberty, should strive to
maintain the concert of Europe; avoid land-grabbing and beware
of the fickle delusion that peace is promoted by large arm-
pp
ament3*'“'^ On November 12, 1855, Gladstone set forth his whole
view on colonies and colonial policy in a speech which he made
at Chester* Speaking of white colonists he said, .
20* Loc* cit*
21. Ibid*. I, 360*
22* Paul Knaplund, Gladstone’s Foreign Policy /New York,
1935), pp, 1-17, passim. *
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Govern them upon a principle of freedom* Defend them against
aggression from without. Regulate their foreign relations#
These things belong to the colonial connection. But of the
duration of that connection, let them be the judges, and I
predict that if you leave them the freedom of judgment it
will be hard to say when the day shall come Tiihen they will
wish to sex)arate from the great name of England,"^® Carry¬
ing out this philosophy he administered a verbal lashing to
Lord Palmerston at the time of the second Chinese War in 1857,
Gladstone declared that there was no more glory for Britain in
fighting China than in making war on women and children*
The period from 1856 to 1880 can be passed over with the
observation that Gladstone's first ministry was from 1868 to
1874, It is in his second ministry (1880-1885) that he came
into direct contact with South Africa, "For forty years,"
said Gladstone in 1881, "I have regarded the South African
question as the one great tinsolved and perhaps \msolvable
problems of oiar colonial system,
Gladstone recognized the problem Its true proportions.
He saw that racial differences were the most fundamental cause
of misunderstanding and conflict. The problem was made more
23, Morley, Gladstone. I, 363,
There are also two other speeches of the same period Thich
show the same philosophy; one at Mold, September 29, 1856,
and the other at Liverpool on the same evening,
24, Morley, Gladstone. Ill, 22,
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difficult for the English “because of the fact that the Negroes
outnxonhered the whites by a ratio of five to one. It is said
by many American writers that if there had been no Negroes there
would have been no Civil War. One can say with e qual assurance
that had there been no Negroes in South Africa there would have
been no Boer War. At a much later date Viscount Gladstone,
grandson of W. E. Gladstone, suggested that “the problem is not
how to make South Africa a white or a black man’s country—it
should be both—but how to adjust the relationships between
white and black”
The situation as Gladstone found it in 1880 was indeed
cconplicated. Guided by the Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon,
the Beaconsfleld ministry had annexed the Transvaal.^®
Sir Bartle Frere, the man whom Lord Carnarvon considered to be
"eminently fitted to c arry Confederation", failed not only in
obtaining the allegiance of the Boers, but deliberately forced
the Zulus tinder Cetewayo into a war with England. After a
few initial successes, chief among which was at Isandhlwana,
the superior resources and equipment of the English brou^t
about the inevitable result. The Government was far from
being happy over the situation, however. The v/ar had been
entered into contrary to Instructions from the Home Office;
pelitioal difficultiblf wei^ - oreafeed lWaVing^^httfyy financial
25. Harris, Europe and Africa, p. 229.
26. See Supra. p. 11. Infra, pp. 41.44^
27. Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli. II, 1290-1295.
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burden in its wake. The cotintry at large registered their
dissatisfaction with the situation by defeating Beaconsfield's
pO
ministry in 1880 and bringing Gladstone back.
Since Sir Bartle Prere was rightly held responsible for
the Zulu War, it was universally ea^iected that Gladstone would
recall him. Contrary to these ea3)actations, Gladstone, en«
29
cotiraged by the Queen, showed no Inclination to do so. The
reason for his attitude was ihat Prere was needed to carry
out Confederation.
In the beginning Gladstone had been averse to annex¬
ation, believing that it would only involve England in "un¬
mixed mischief". In one of his Midlothian speeches he de¬
rided the imperialists for bringing a "free European Christian
Republic within the limits of a monarchy, though out of eight
thousand persons qualified to vote, six thousand five hundred
voted against it." In another Midlothian speech Gladstone
vigorously attacked Prere and his policy when he condemned
"the record of ten thousand Zulus slain for no other offense
than their attempt to defend against an artillery with their
naked bodies their hearths and homes.
It might be well to remember, however, that these sent¬
iments of Gladstone’s were expressed during Beaconsfield's
28. Lord Beaconsfield was premier from 1874-1880. Lord Carn¬
arvon was Secretary for the colonies.
29. Correspondence between the Queen and Gladstone.
Phillip Guedalla, The Queen and Mr. Gladstone (New York,
1954), pp. 464, 490, 49^^
30. Morley, Gladstone. II, 27.
51. Ibid.. II, 592.
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ministry, against which he was working with all his energy'.
It is very possible that much of Gladstone's antagonism to
the "forward policy" was bom of the political necessity for
the liberals to oppose the conservatives. In any event, his
actions after 1880 seem to indicate that this was the case.
When ^Qseph Chamberlain, president of the board of trade,
openly admitted that the Government had made a mistake in
the annexation, Gladstone replied in a letter to Chamberlain:
"I am not prepared for myself to concede that we made a mis¬
take in not advising a revocation of the annexation when we
II
came in, 32
One possible reason for the change of front was his
personal sympathy for the wretched plight of the Natives,
Apparently as the memory of his slave-holding father faded
as an environmental influence and was superseded by that of
Canning, he began to believe in human treatment for human
beings—even if t?iose human beings happened to be Negroes,
Of his personal feelings at this time one cannot be i^oditive.
However, officially he pointed out "that obligations had now
been contracted, especially towards the Natives, that could
i*32a
not be set aside , He further stated that though the
white inhabitants should enjoy the fullest liberty to manage
32, J, L, Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain^ (London,
1932), I, 441. ^
32a, Morley, Gladstone, III, 29,
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their local affairs, he believed that this liberty could
be most easily and promptly conceded to the Transvaal” as
a member of a South African Confederation”.^®
T6 this point nothing has been said of the Queen and
her attitude toward the colonial policy of the Government
in South Africa. In spite of the fact that the British
sovereign no longer ruled by divine ri^t, he or she exer¬
cised considerable influence over the Government. Moreover
this influence was sufficiently great to be very definitely
felt, especially in foreign and colonial relations because
in this field the Grown still held many "xinabrogated pre¬
rogatives”.®^ Both Gladstone and Beaconsfield made daily
reports to the Queen. Her private Secretary, General Pon-
soriboy, was kept quite busy with her state correspondence.®®
It was mAinly throu^ the Premier that her influence
was felt, and it is from her correspondence with Gladstone
that her attitude toward the Boers and the South African
liolicy is discovered. In a letter to Gladstone dated
December 26, 1880, the Queen said to the Premier: “The Queen
feels much anxiety about the cape and expects that the Govern¬
ment will take energetic action to assert her authority in
those parts of the colonies which have revolted. The Boers
33. Morley, Gladstone. Ill, 30.
34. Knapltmd, Gladstone * s Foreign Policy, p. 25, also 18-37,
passim.
35. Guedalla, Queen 'and Gladstone. This book contains more
than 6000 letters and telegrams of the Queen’s corres¬
pondence with Gladstone. See also The Letters of Queen
Victoria 1837-1861, Edited by A. C. Benson, 3 vols.
(London, 1911).
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are a dangerous foe and we shall have to support Sir G« Colley
strongly."^®
Gladstone’s reply was received by the Queen on December
28, 1380• The PrOTiier assured the Queen of the Government’s
intention of retaining the annexation* He further advised
her tiaat "Quite apart from opinions held and even retained
37
on the policy of annexing the Transvaal, Lord Kimberley
•ZQ
proposed to instruct Sir Hercules Robinson in unequivocal
ti
terms of the duty of maintaining the annexation*®®
The Queen's attitude toward the Hatlves can perhaps be
judged from a note which she made in her diary June 20, 1879*
The entry read: "Had a bad restless nl^t, haunted by this
awful event, seeing those horrid Zulus constantly before me,
• • The Queen was almost fanatically zealous in push¬
ing the war against the Zulus. She heaped honors upon the
British soldiers and seems to have had no sympathy for the
Natives*^^
What the Queen’s and Gladstone's attitude had been to¬
ward Sir Bartle Prere is seen in the following letters. It
36* Guedalla, Queen and Gladstone, p* 490.
37. Colonial Secretary. D. N* B. Supplement 1901-1911, 695-699.
38. Hi^ Commissioner of South Africa* D.N.B., XXII, 1172-1175.
39. Guedalla, Queen and Gladstone. p. 492.
40. Sidney Lee, Queen Victoria. A Biography^ (London, 1904),
p. 451. The event spoken of was the Zulu War.
41. Ibid.. pp, 464-465.
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nniist not be forgotten that it was Prere whb was immediately
responsible for the Zulu War and indirectly for the war with
the Boers in 1880*
In a letter from 10 Downing Street of Majr 28, 1880,
G-ladstone informed the Queen that he had used his influence
to retain Sir Bartle Prere, but that his retention depended
upon two things: “first. Sir Bartle*8 ability to push Con¬
federation, second the abating of popular opinion against
42
him in the house, press, and country at large. The Queen
answered the same day.
“Balmoral Castle,
May 28, 1880
The Queen, in thanking Mr. Gladstone for
his reports, wishes to say that she is glad to
see that he has held such firm language aboufe
Sir Bartle Prere—for whom she had a great ad¬
miration. ^is recall would be very disastrous.
If he had committed faults with respect to the
too sudden commencement of the war^S (which the
Queen doubts, as she believes it was quite in¬
evitable and that he saved the colony)—that is
now over, and his great knowledge of the country,
his courage combined with conciliatoriness and
great abilities make him far the„fittest to carry
out the policy of Confederation. 44
But in spite of the Queen*s “great admiration" for him
and in spite of Gladstone *s confidence in him, popu5.ar opin¬
ion forced Gladstone to recall Sir Bartle. Seizing upon this
as the opportune moment the Boers “resbrted to arms in order
42. Guedalla, Queen and Gladstone, p. 492.
43. For historical background of the Zulu War see T. J, Lucas,
The Zulus and the British Frontiers(London, 1879), and
Thomas Mofolo, Chaka, an Historical Novel (London, 1931).
44. Guedalla, Queen and Gladstone. p. 468.
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to win their political freedom." In the military proceedings
which followed, the English General G. Colley, made a tactical
error at Majuba Hill, which resulted in the near annihiliation
of the British detachment.^® ^Shis error, which occured after
peace proposals had been accepted by the Boers, placed Gladstone
in a diplomatic dilemma. Should a military error on the part of
an English General be made a plea for ab«ttdoning a policy de¬
liberately adopted for what was considered to have been powerful
and decisive reasons? This renunciation on the part of the
English would have been unfair to the Boers if they had agreed
to the peace proposals before the incident.^® And this is ex¬
actly what had happened. The Boers answer had been decided in
the affirmative and had been dispatched to General Colley by
Kruger from Heidelburg in ignorance of "Majuba Hill" the day
after the General’s death
Personally, Giadstond desired peace and the cessation
48
of further unnecessary bloodshed. Politically, he feared,
along with other members of his cabinet,that the Free State
would join the Boers of the Transvaal On the other hand
the bulk of British opinion was strongly opposed to the grant-
45. A fairly detailed account is given in Morley, Gladstone.
Ill, 22-46. A much fuller account is given in lL'ad.y
Bellairs, The Transvaal War. 1880-1881,(London, 1885).
For the Boers' side ot the' question see Kruger, Memoirs,
I, pp. 169-186.
46. Morley, Gladstone. pp. 37, 38, 42.
47. Lovell.South Africa, p, 32
48. Knaplund, Gladstone's Foreign Policy, p. 89.
. Morley, Gladstone, III, 40. This possibility is discussed
at length. Also see Roundel Palmer, Earl of Selboume
Memorials. Personal and Political ISOB-rSoF*(London. 1898).
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ing of any concession to the Boers* After the Majuha Hill In¬
cident loany wanted revenge, or, as they called it, "the re¬
establishment of British Supremacy"* Foremost among this latter
group was Queen Victoria* In a Ittter to Gladstone dated March
11, die Indicated that she could not understand any "surrender
to Boer demands"* Later General Ponsonby wrote the following
letter to Gladstone* "The Queen trusts that Mr* Gladstone
will urge on Lord Kimberley to be very firm and not let the
peace be carried out unless every condition is firmly adhered
to by the Boers* The peace itself is felt to be so painful
and humiliating in many ways that we must not go a step fur¬
ther* *
The attack made by Parliament upon the ministry was also
severe* The most telling argumentwaa that the Government would
be conceding to three defeats what they had refused to ten times
as many "humble petitions", memorials, and remonstrances* What
had been refused at the behest of peaceful prayers wo\ild be
given to men with arms in their hands*®^ Gladstone was severely
criticized by military authorities who desired that the war
continue for the reason that it was the "first contest with
Europeans since the breach-loader came in and it was desired
to give troops* • * confidence in the new fashioned weapon*"®^
50* Guedalla, Queen and Gladstone* p* 508* There are also a
niudber of other letters illustrating the same attitude*
See ibid*. pp* 500, 501, 505, 506*
51* This point of view is brought out in a number of Parlia¬
mentary debates, the gists of which are given in W* S*
Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchills (London, 1906), I,
190-195* See also P* w* Hirst. Early Life and Letters
of John Morley^ (London, 1927), II, 103-105*
52* Morley, Gladstone. Ill, 42*
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In a brilliant answer to his Jingoistic opponents, Gladstone
eloquently asked how the British could have said to the Boers:
"Althou^ we mi^t have treated with you before these
militaiTr miscarriages, we can not do so now until we offer
up a certain number of victims in expiation of the blood
that was shed. Until that has been done the very thing which
we believed before to be reasonable, which we were ready to
discuss with you, we refuse to discuss how, and we must wait
until Moloch has been appeased. We have opened a door for
negotiation; are we to close it again because a handful of
our forces rashly seized a post they could not hold. The ac¬
tion of the Boers was defensive of the Status Quo, for if we
had established ourselves cm Majubatheir camp on living’s Hek
would have been imtenable ... It would be \mjust and cruel,
it would bo cowardly and mean, if on account of these defen¬
sive operations we refused to go forward with the negotiations
which before the first of these miscarriages had occurred, we
had already declared that we were willing to promote and under¬
take.”®®
In this maze of conflicting opinion, perhaps it wooild be
well to review the facts in the case in their chronological
order. The Government had decided that its annexation of the
Transvaal had been ill timed.The Boers, sensing the Brit¬
ish attitude, first petitioned then resorted to arms in or¬
der to win back their independence, ^t in spite of military
victories the Boers themselves proposed an inqilry. The Govern¬
ment consented on condition that the Boer tro<p»be dispersed.
Without waiting a reasonable length of time for a reply, the
British General unwittlingly provoked the Boers to attack
him, a?he English were ingloriously defeated. The question then
arose, did this defeat cancel the previously concluded bargains?
Gladstone believed that it did not, and in the face of
determined opposition and bitter criticism from the Queen, from
53, Loc. Pit,
54, Lovell, South Africa, p, 35.
Parliament, and frcati the cotintry at large, he held his point
and authorized the Pretoria Convention* It is in situations
like this, says his best-known biographer, that the moral
courage of the great minister is revealed. For moral courage
was needed even if '‘aversion to useless bloodshed fortunately
55
happened to coincide with high prudence and sound policy".
A commission of Inquiry was sent to the Transvaal and
in August, 1881, by the Pretoria Convention it was agreed
that the Transvaal was to have quasi-Independence subject
to the suzerainty of the Queen and with certain specified
reservations: It was not to tax foreigners more than burgers
or attempt to extend its borders; nor was it to make treaties
with other nations, except the Orange Free State, without the
approval of the Home Government. Religious freedom and the
earlier regulations against slavery were to be enforced, and
certain well-defined stipulations providing for the protec-
tion of Natives and their property were added.
This arrangement stood \mchanged for only three years,
at the end of which time the Boers, not having been satis¬
fied with the amount of independence granted them by the
Pretoria Convention, again sent Kruger to London. Kruger
was unsuccessftil in his attempt tociesvIiMM Lord Derby of this
55. Morley, Gladstone. Ill, 44.
56. Lovell, South Africa, pp. 36-58, passim.
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idea* However, the Government did permit the old title of
South African Republic to be dug up and bestowed upon the
Transvaal. This conference was called the London Convention
of 1884.
The most Important modification of the convention was
the provision for "white men to have full liberty to reside
in any part of the republic, to trade in it, and to be liable
to the same tsixes as those exacted from the citizens of the
republic
At this point Gladstone's active contact with South
Africa comes to a conclusion. Prom all the available evid¬
ence one may conclude that Gladstone was actuated in his
South African policy by a keen sense of justice, which was
modified or at least influenced ty political expediency.
Because of this devotion to the ideal of justice and fair
play, and his refusal to depart from it, even when it con¬
flicted with the best interests of the British Empire,
Gladstone earned the active opposition, if not the hatred of
CQ
the Queen. Moreover, the last quarter of the nineteenth
centu3?y saw the birth of a spirit of unscrupulous imperial¬
ism which has continued until today.
57. The terms of the agreement reached at the London Con¬
vention in February, 1884, are given in Walker,
South Africa, p. 404.
58. Guedalla, Queen and Gladstone, pp. 67-153. Also
Lee, Victoria, p. 526. Also M. K. Waddington, Letters
of a Diplomat's Wife 1883-1900^ (London, 1903), p. 371.
CHAPTER III
Joseph Chamberlain
vmienever a man rises to prominence among his fellowmen,
there are those who at once seek to explain this fact by
tracing his origin back to some famous and aristocratic an¬
cestor or ancestors. Any such explanation would be entirely
out of order in the case of Joseph Chamberlain* For though
he could boast of a proud and distinguished heritage, it was
essentially middle class, and made no claim to aristocracy or
royalty* To an unusual extent this heredity played a discern¬
ible part in the life of Joseida. Ghaniberlaln • In order to un¬
derstand the Chamberlain of the 1880*s, it is necessary to
become acquainted with the Chamberlain of the 1840*s and 1850*s,
and to be at least introduced to the Chamberlains of preceding
generations. Through his grandmother, Martha Strutt, Chamberr
lain*s origin can be traced back three centuries. One of these
ancestors, John Spicer, was burned at the stake in 1556 for his
non-conformist beliefs.^ Another, William Spicer, was bom in
Elizabeth's time and was an eminent non-conforming clergyman.^
From these Spicers there came a line of non-conformists of the
Bd.ddle class.
Ob his father's side of the family tree, the Chamberlain
record begins with Daniel Chamberlain, a minister of Wiltshire





Covinty who died in 1760* Early in th« 18th Century, however,
his son, William Chamberlain, had removed to London where he
laid the foundations of the family fortune* From italti^erl^
became a shoe-siaker, a trade udiieh was to be followed cm the
4
same premises for one hundred and thirty years* He also be¬
came (in 1739) a member of the Cordwainers Company, an organ¬
ization shich grew to have political significance*^
The first Joseph Chamberlain, who was the second son of
William Chamberlain, was lihe his father, a steady, industrious
non-conformist* He rose through all the distinctions of the
Cordwainers Company and died in 1836* The second Joseph
Chamberlain, the father of the Statesman, was of an austere
and thou^tful oast> resolute and capable* His wife, nee
Caroline Harben, represented, on the other hand, a family whose
spirit had guided them Into a fortune*^
The union was a happy one* On the whole the Chamberlain
family had been a serious, steady, stock, faithful in the com¬
mon and routine tasks, diligent in business and in such civic
duties as came within their sjdiere of life* Moreover, the
family was endowed with the valuable quality of persistence
and perseverance* %e Harbens breu£^t in a more temperamental
3* S* H* Jeyes, Hr* Chamberlain. His Life and Public Career j
(Edinburgh, 1^3), p* 1*
4* Garvin, Chamberlain. I, 10*
5* Cordwain is a word resulting from the English mispronunc¬
iation of Cordowan as meaning leather from Cordova* From
the designation of materials it came to mean workers and,
finally, a workers* union or guild*
6* Garvin, Chamberlain. I, 16*
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strala: a love for the aesthetlo, aa adventaroaa spirit^
and a mental alertneea tliat evidenced itself Sa the ability
to make quick deeisoaa* It was from this miion cmd with
thic eisMlhinald^ horeditj^ry pMsibilitiec that "yomig'''
'
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Joiei^ Chaadsorlato wa» bom Jhly 8, 1836*
Several instances in the childhood days wf Joseidi
CSiaaiberlaln seem to point to the truth of the saying that
"the child is the father of the man"* At tiae age of ei|^t
he founded a Peace Society of which he became president by
fij^ting for it* %is seeming inconsistency can be duplic*
ated OB several occasions*® In 1850, Chttaberlain, then
fourteen years old, was sent to 'Qaiversity College School*
He made an excellent record but up^ graduation was not sent
to Oxford* His father believed that since he was net able
to a«aa& all his sens -^iroug^ the hi^bior branches of edncation,
it Would be unfair to send his eldest sen*® At sixteen he
entered his father’s business* He learned the shoemaker’s
trade from both the industrial and sianagerial angles* Two
years later, the elder,. Joseph Chamberlain, in emspany with
a Xr* Hettlefold set up a screw factory in BirmiaghsaM* Yeung
GSiamberlaIn was sent with young Hettlefold to Birmiiij^iam as
ci^Hsanager* So well did Ghamberlain manage the sales of ^e
business that at t^e early age Of thirty«piKL|^t ^ ht was able
7. Ibid*. I, 16-19.
8* Ibid*, I, 83*
9* Ibid*, li 37*
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te retire with a substantial incene*^^
It was during the twenty years which he spent as manager
of Chamberlain and Nettlefold that his interest was aroused
in politics* Chamberlain*s political career semmB to be cme
of those exceedingly rare instemces in which an individual he-
comes a statesman la order to help the state rather than be*
cause he wants to have the state help him. His very entrance
into politics seems to Indicate the truth of this assertion.
Shortly' after his arrival in Birmingham Chamberlain had Joined
and had taken a leading part in the Blionln^am and Edgbaston
Debating Society. He soon became an effective speaker in ad¬
dition to being a naturally clear thinker. With this ex¬
perience as a background he entered the political ring as the
champion of free education.^^
The Birmingham of the 1860 *s was a factory town with a
comparatively few years behind it and ¥/ith all the squalor and
unsanitary conditions usually present in a young factory town
of mush-room growth, ^he labororers were overworked but un-
12
derpaid and underfed. It was the sight of wretched human be¬
ings wallowing in filth and degradation and of their children
growing up in vicious Ignorance that moved d'oaeph Chamberlain
to set himself to the gigantic task of ij^roving those deplor-
1 ^
able conditions. He taught classes in history, Latin, arith¬
metic, French, botany, and English. At the same time he flung
10. H. W. C. Davis, and J, R. H. Weaver, editors. The Dictionary
of National Biggraphy^ (London. 1927;, Vol. 1912, p. lofe.
11. Olarvin, Chamberlain, I, 90-101, passim.
12. Ibid. .1. 180-181.
13. Ibid.. I, 91.
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hlBself Into the campaign for a watlti>nal system of free educa¬
tion, for as a non'^dnfoinnist, he did not want education to be
under the control of the churoh*^^ In March, 1870, Chamberlain
became chairman of the National Education League and as such,
voiced with extreme vigor the case of the non-conformists in
15
the question of national education. During this period
Chamberlain limited himself, nationally, to the question of
education but locally he was active in securing the adoption
of other reforms as well.
He became mayer of Birmin^am in 1873, and was reelected
16
in 1874 and 1875. In answer to the charge of radicalism he
declared that any radical tendencies on his part were the re¬
sult of social necessity for political action. Ignorance
and the existence of unsanitary and disgraceful housing con¬
ditions were the two main evils. The Improvement of these lat¬
ter conditions lay, ho declared, with the municipalities them¬
selves, and the effectiveness of his efforts is seen in the
unmistakable results of his work. They included the purchase
by the Birmingham coi?p©ration of the gas-works, water-works,
and sewage farms, the destruction of the slums in the heart
of the city, and the provision for artisans djselllngs. Ho
worked for the extension of fi?©o libraries and airt galleries,
and sought in every way to make Birmingham a place in which
14. fi. J£. Vol. 1912-1921, p. 102.
15. Garvin, Chamberlain, I, 92, 95.
16. D. N. B. Vol. 1912-1921, p. 103.
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its Inliabltants could take civic pride Nor were his in¬
terests entirely limited to Birmingham. At the close of 1874^
he arranged a conference of municipal authorities and others in¬
terested in the sanitation of large towns in order to create a
sound publio opinion on the subject. It took place in January^
1875, and was a starting point in the development of municipal
18
social refoimi.
Realizing that national legislation was necessary for national
ireforms, Chamberlain, sought a berth in Parliament in 1874. He did
not obtain one, however, until 1876 when he was elected from Bir-
"1 Q
mingham as a colleague of John Bright. In domestic affairs
Chamberlain agreed with his illustrious colleague but openly dls-
agi*eod with his pacifist foreign policy.^®
From the very first Chamberlain made his presence felt in the
House of Commons. By 1880 he had become a cabinet member, holding
the portfolio of the President of the Board of Trade in Gladstone's
ministry
Chamberlainb early years in Parliament had found him chiefly
Interested in affairs relating to local government, the state of
endowed schools in Ireland, the prevention of cattle disease, and
various legal reforms connected with patents, bankruptcy and mer¬
chant shippingOn these and allied subjects he spoke with the
17. Garvin, Chamberlain. I, 189.
18. D. N. B., Vol, 1912-i9gi^ p. 103.
19. Jeyes, Chamberlain, p. 54.
20. Garvin, Chamberlain. I, 185-214, passim.
21. Morley, Gladstone. II, 654.
22. Jeyes, Chamberlain, p. 62.
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atithorlty of a practical man of business, and with a clarity
which pleased the dignified and unruffled audience that lis¬
tened to him. He did not shrink from the trouble of getting
up a host of complicated facts in order to prove a point in
debate, while his controversial sallies on such matters as
flogging in the army and on the Eastern Question showed him
to be as effective in extempore discussion as in set speeches.
He was, in fact, engaged, whether intentionally or otherwise,
in molding himself into the accepted type of parllamentaz^
statesmanship
Thus it was that the Chamberlain to whose lot it fell
to deal with the South African Question was by no means a
novice in the a]*t of parliamentary procedure. Moreover, like
Carnarvon, ho had made a thorough study of colonial affairs
He was cognizant of the fact that the volume of British trade
outside the Empire was so vastly in excess of the transaction
between mother country and colonies that many British states¬
men advocated the surrender of unprofitable colonies. He had
made surveys, sent out investigators, and listened to or read
their reports with interest. On the basis of these reports
he had decided that the hope of the country lay in the devel¬
opment of the natural resources of such colonies • Politically
he was, without a doubt, an ia^rialist. Probably his real
25. Ibid.. pp. 63-64.
S4. Ibid.. pp. 63-68, 382, 389.
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reason for wan^ls^ to abandon the Transvaal was the cost
ehioh retaining'it would entail; moreover, the Boers*
treatment of the Natives had not been brought to his at¬
tention at this time«^^ Even before the Government was
fonsed he and Gladstone had encouraged Boer espeotations
Og
of reeevered independenoe•
At the very first meeting of the Cabinet, therefore,
Oiamberlain pressed for a complete reversal of Lord Beacons-
field's policy in South Africa and urged the revocation of
the annexation of the TransvaalA few weeks later he
wrote to the Premier: "I doubt the wisdom and the perman¬
ence of the annexation. Unless some unforeseen circumstances
lead to a large immigration of Englishmen into the Transvaal,
I believe the Boers will, sooner or later, worry this country
into granting their independence,"^^
Chamberlain, however, had a deep reverence for Gladstone
and was g3?eatly influenced by him. This influence was evident
on this occasion, "The main thing which met us," Gladstone
had said, "was the existence of a large Native population to
whom by establishment of the Queen's supremacy, we hold
86, This os^ootation was openly admitted in a letter from
Paul KPUger to Gladstone in May, 1880. See Kruger,
Memoirs. lGd» sud Garvin, (^mberlain. I, 438,
27, Garvin, ghsmberlain. 1, 439, See also Horley, Gladstone.
Ill, 28-SW; and Paul Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's
Imperial Policy. (London, 1927), p, Isl,
28, Garvin, Chamberlain. I, 439,
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ouraalTes to have given a pledge •** To revoke the annexation
meant to abandon 450^000 natives in the Transvaal to the ten¬
der mercies of the Boers «dio desired to keep them in a state
of 8lave3?y.®® Lord Kimberly, the Colonial Soc3?etary, also
opposed the revocation on the sane grounds l^oover, tho
Inperiallstio Queen Victoria wanted to retain the sinnexation.^^
The Liberal Gtovemment, therefore, decided to maintain the an¬
nexation of the Transvaal in spite of the previously declared
opposition to the policy pursued by the Conservatives.
ISae mistake that the Government made at this time was* not
the failure to grant independence to the Boers, but rather the
failure to provide troops sufficient to prevent an uprising.
The little British force "on the spot” under General Colley
was entirely inadequate. It caused the Boers to believe that
the Goverxsaent was either unwilling or unable to employ force.
The situation grew more tOSase. Finally in November, 1880, a
Boer named Bezuidenhout, refused to pay taxes to the Queen*s
Government. When an official seized his wagons and attempted
ito WgizP ^selling them at auction at Potchefst room, armed
Boers rede in and the war began. The climax of the war came
29. Gmrvin, Chamberlain. I, 439.
30. James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa.(New York. 1900),
pp. 113-116, Walker. ifiloa. pp . 176-179. 181, 887,
209. Also Howard Robinson. Development of the British
Bmpire.(Cambridge. 1922), pp. 889, 27o.
31. Palmer, Memorials.II. 10.
32. Guedalla, Queen and Gladstone .pp. 490, 491.
Walker, South Africa. p. 387.33.
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at Majuba Hill where the British force was annihilated.
IHie disaster threw not only Parliament but the country
at large into excited discussions and debates as to what
course should be pursued. In the eyes of Chamberlain the
question was still whether the annexation was right or
wrong. He thou^t that it was wrong, and that it should be
reversed without further bloodshed for the sake of avenging
"the honour of the flag",^® He was given ample opportunities
to set forth his views in Parliament, ^'or since the Colonial
Secretary, Lord Kimberly, was in the House of Lords he (CQiam-
berlaln) was the spokesman for the colonial office in the
commons. However, one week before Colley*s initial repulse
at Laing*a Nek, Chamberlain refused to vote against a private
member’s motion condemning the annexation; for though it
was his duty to support the cabinet he believed that the an¬
nexation should bo condemned. He was still closing his eyes
to the plight of the Natives if forsaken by the Government.
In a speech made June 7, 1881, at Birmingham in defense
of the retrocession Chamberlain said:
"it is not difficult to be wise after the event. It is
not difficult to see now tl- at we did wrong in not reversing
annexation earlier, I frankly admit that wo made a mistake , , •
We are a great and powerful nation. What is the use of being
34. Supra . Chapter II, p. 29,
35. Garvin, Chamberlain. I, 440
38, Loc, cit•
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great and powerful If we are afraid to admit an error when
we are conscious of It? • • • I appe«OL to the iopartlal puh«>
lie opinion of Eusope and America, v^ich has approved of the
action of the Government in preferring justice to revenge
and the host intereste of South Africa to the vain imrsult
of military glory
m spite of the divergent views of eatinet members^
and of the country at large, thid Government decided in favor
of retrocession eueid the Pretoria Convention was held. The
Boers were given a "Transvaal state" under the Queen's
<XQ
Suserainty. It was not independent in foreign affairs,'^*'
but was self-governing.
Within a year after the retrocession the Beers were
again causing trouble. Defying the Pretoria Convention,
Beer freebooters and outlaws broke in amongst the nearest
Beohuana tribes, whom the Government had pledged to preteot,
seized their pastures and their flocks and rode roughshod
over them.^^ In 1882 Boer adventurers set up the little
republics of Stelland and Goehen^^ on British territory.
37. Garvin, Chamberlain. I, 441.
38. Knaplund, GladstOTO's Fereifm Policy, p. 75. "The
Government"Vf Y686-1S85 was rick in talent, in ex¬
perience, and in administrative ability but was tom
by factional strife and was ineffective as a govern¬
ing body. This was especially true in matters oon-
cemlng foreign and imperial relations."
39. Lovell, South Africa. Chapter II, "Pretoria and London
Conventions", pp. 36-74, passim.
40. Walker, South Africa. p. 386.
41. Ibid., p. 387.
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Two famous churchmen, John Mackenzie and Dr. Dale, In¬
terested themselves in the welfare of the They
began a campaign to arouse public opinion in England. One
of the mass meetinga^as held at the Tewn Hall, Bizmain^piam.
It was at this meeting that Dr. Dale himself moved the res¬
olution trusting the British Government "will firmly dis¬
charge the i*esponsibilities which they have undertaken in
the protection of the Native races on the Transvaal border".
Dr. Dale wrote to Chamberlain, who was a personal friend,
asking for the aid of his influence. Chamberlain answered in
a letter #hieh:e±piaided, in a vex*y frank manner, his South
African policy and his attitude toward the l^atlves.
"... If the strict execution of the convention is
pressed home we must not conceal from ourselves the prob¬
ability that we may be engaged in a Boer War, the most
oeetly, unsatisfactory and difficult of all the little wars
which we can possibly undertake. ^Ihe circumstances attend-
:^g the surrender of the Transvaal have no doubt given the
Beers an excessive opinion of their power. In the event of
a new conflict they will probably secure the assistance of
the Orange Free State and the sympathy of the Dutch and pos¬
sibly Germany. ... I have always hoped that as the Natives
enormously outnumber the Boers, being in the proportion of
15 or 20 to one, the latter, when left alone, would be com¬
pelled to come to terms with their neighbors and to treat
them with ordinary fairness. If this should not be the case
our probl«n is a serious one, and altogether I do not say
that we are necessarily to stand aloof, still the greatest
caution ou^t to bo observed. • .
In short, the Beers' consistent disregard of Native
rights changed Chamborlaia trmf n strong advocate of re¬
trocession into "a watchful erltSs of the Transvaal".^
42. Garvin, CHiamberlaln. I, 4^«
43. Ibid.. I, 490.
44. Lovell, South Africa, p. 39.
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Still Chamberlain advanced slowly, as his years of
varied experience had taught him to do* He began by aid¬
ing exhaustive Inquiries Into the affairs of Bechuanaland,
Stellaland and Coshen* These studies disclosed that tribe
after tribe had been conquered by the Boers, and It was
only a matter of time when the Boers would have subdued
them all and subjected them to the usual esqploltatlon
When Chamberlain grasped this reality his whole at¬
titude changed and he took the lead In Insisting that the
Government must face Its duty. He proposed an expedition
to save the two Bechuana Chiefs, Hontsloa and Monkois>ane and
to esqpel the Beer freebooters, but failed to carry the cab¬
inet
Kruger^*^ went to London on a visit and obtained the
London Convention, Febmiary 27, 1884* In spite of the
fact that the New Convention had, like the Pretoria Convention,
strictly defined their boundaries, the Boers of the Protect¬
orate at once began to make assaults on the Bechuanas* They
fell upon the Chief Hontsloa In an attack led by Commandant
Joubert, himself, and defeated the Bechuanas* Next a Boer
proclamation announced that Hontsloa, a Brltli^ subject and
his country were placed under the control of the Transvaal,
45* Jeyes, Chamberlain, pp* 142, 143*
46* Garvin, Chamberlain. I, 490.
47. Paul Kruger, tdie Boer leader, was four times president
of the Boor Republic*
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3epteal>er, 1884.^ There was something that even the smallest
of the "Little Englanders" conld not stand for, so Chaidserlain
was able to carry the cabinet nnanimously*
Chamberlain made plans for an everwhelmlng force to be
employed in ousting the Boers from &p4tlsh territory* Early
in Kovember he annonnoed the determination of the Government
at all risks to carry out their obligations to the Native
chiefs; the cabinet stood behind him^solidly* His policy
proved to be as fortunate and judicious as it was sagacious*
Sir Charles Warren with four thousand men marched into
Bechuanaland* swept out the marauders and restored the chiefs
without losing a single life or firing a single shot*^^
If it had been expected that the Warren expedition would
settle the difficulties in South Africa, the Government was
doomed to disappointment* The opening of gold mines in 1885,
the Boer’s contempt for British arms. President Kruger’s
SO
regal reception in Germany , and the Boer policy of linking
48* W* H* Woodard, Eyanslon of the British ^nire. (Cambridge.
1931), p * 296. See also HSbinoon. feriVish Etoplre. p * 365 *
Per Boor version see Kruger, Memoirs. I* 194»»l95«
49* Garvin, Chamberlain. I, 493*
50* A clear a^lysis of the situation from 1885 to 1895 is
given in 6]fyce, South Africa. Chapter XXV, pp* 420-447*
On the other hand an e^’f^eotive criticism of the Hitlaiil-
er’s case is given in J* A* Hobson, ihe War in South
^rica« Iks Causes and Effects^ (London, T^0T“pp, fedo-
505. passiin. See' also Hugh Marshall Hole. The Jameson
(London, 1930)*
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up with German interests, all served as causes for friction
between Britain and Boer. Prom 1885 to 1895, Uitlander,
Africander, and Boer were piling up grievances against each
other, the result of which was to be attempted revolution and
war. The diplematic relations which led up to this war were
conceived and carried out by Cecil Rhodes, the man whom
Engl£uid is indebted in a large measure for her South African
Empire the man for whom the Hhedeslae are named. According
to his own confession Rhodes desired to see the map of South
Africa done in red.
An economic depression had forced the TJitlanders to agi¬
tate for relief from undue taxation and governmental restric¬
tions. The government, which was entirely controlled by Boera
refused to consider reforms. The TJitlanders then sought to
get some share in the government as the only means by which re¬
forms could be brought about. Here their hopes were frustrated
by the Boers* stringent citizenship laws. 5Ehis was at least
the professed cause of Uitlander dissatisfaction.
51. After continuous restrictions, in 1894 aliens were made
eligible for naturalization after two years registration.
Haturallzatito meant liability for police duty. It also
meant knio^th of and the loss of the
alienia original citizenship. Two years more
were then required for the second stage of citizenship pre¬
paration, another ten years were then required for full
enfranchisement and this was made dependent upon a request
in writing from a majority of the burghers in the applicant*s
ward, and the consent of the President and Executive.
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There were perhaps two reasons why Rhodes wanted to break
the power of the Ihatoh: First, Rhodes, as a director and share¬
holder In the consolidated (Goldfields, was directly concerned in
the heavy burdens Kruger was laying on mines. Second, Rhodes had
dedicated his life to the creation of a Federated South Africa
under the British flag, and Kjmgerism was an obstacle—one which
had to be removed if he were to achieve success.
raiodes mlgiKtlhave been a genius at organizii^ commercial en¬
terprises, but he was certainly a failure at organizing a wswo-
lution. He attempted to prepare the "reformers" at Johannesburg
for a "coup de main" to be made with the help of a company of
finditing men led by hr. L. S. Jameson. The movement failed to
receive the support which Hhodes had expected in Johannesburg.
To make matters worse, Kruger soon knew all about the plans and
prepared to thwart them. Meanwhile Dr. Jameson grew Impatient
of the delay, and deciding that "The Johannesburgers would never
move if they were left to themselves", he cut the telegraph
wires to keep from receiving the negative answer wl ich he knew
would be forthcoming from Rhodes; and advanced with five hun-
54
dred men into the Transvaal. This act forced Rhodes into the
52. A goodbdjbigrap^of’ Cecil Rhodes, Basil Williams, Cecil Rhodes,.
(London, 1921). See also J. G. Lockhart, Cecil Rhodes.'(Hew
York, 1933),which is merely a short sketck.
53. Lovell, South Africa, pp. 308-309. In answer to the charge
made by some of his critics, that hhewas urged by the con¬
sideration of pecuniary gain, Rhodes wrote to Under-secre¬
tary Harcourt, May 13, 1896.
"l have tried to unite South Africa, and no sordid
motive has Influenced me blame me as you like but
do not do the cruel thing of attributing my conduct to sordid
motives." Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harcourt,. (Lon¬
don, 1923), II, 392.
54. Lovell, South Africa, p. 334.
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open* The Reformers* government was declared, but Kruger*s
police speedily brought a hurmating conclusion to the whole
affair by capturing Jameson and his men at Doo]*nkop and arrest¬
ing sixty of the leading reformers 5ji Jidiannesburg*^^
In the midsummer of 1895 Chamberlain had succeeded Lord
Ripon at the colonial office* It vas under his secretaryship
then, that the "Raid” took place* Ihe question now arises as
to what extent was he responsible for the incident. Did he
actually aid In the direction of It? Did he know about It,
and If so, why did he not stop It?
Soon after he went into office Chamberlain In 1895 granted
to Rhodes* Chartered Cooq>any a strip of Bechuana land territory
six miles wide and stretching the entire length of the Western
border of the Transvaal. The military importance of this was
so great that he Is charged with having known of the use td
which Rhodes and Jameson were to put It—that he was a party to
the plans, an accessory before the fact. Bven some of his friends
at home believed this and regarded it as a c<»apllment CSiaa-
berlaln himself^ hbwever, denied the aceusatlcm.
According to the evidence given by Dr. Rutherford HanSis,^
before the select committee appointed to inquire Into the origin
55. Por ihe reformers* TerslcsoL see lAn Galvin. The Life of
L<a^oiai. 19^), II, 116-173; for Boer ve’rs'l'on see
kmu^r. Memoirs. II, pp, 356-501.
56• Jeyes, Chamberlain, p. 485 .
57. Ibid., p. 484.
58. The London representative of the Chartered Company*
and cirGtoastanees of the Raid, ha (Dr« Harris) Informed Chamherlain,
"that the Chartered Company, if the strip were ceded to it, wonld
not stand by and see the people of Johannesburg tightly pressed if
a rising were to take place there Chamberlain, however^ had no
recollection whatever of such words being used to him, but he re¬
membered that Dr. Harris had wished to give him seme "confidential
information". In his evidence before the committee Qhamberlain
said, "I stopped him at onoO;,! said, I do not want to hear any con¬
fidential information. Am here in an official capacity. I can
only hear information of which I can make official use." Xhe
discussion on this point waxed warm and consumed much time, but
in the end it was decided by the committee that Chamberlain was
innocent of the charge.
The question was then put to the committee—Had any of the
colonial officials received information that could be assumed to
convey a warning of the contemplated Incursion? The answer of
the committee was decisively in the negative. Hothing was brought
out in the inqttt?y which would prove that the-colonlal office had
received, either directly or indirectly, aayiihformati^-on-tho
subject of the Jameson Raid. The assertion of Dr. Harris that he
had made a guarded allusion to the desirability of having a police
force near the border was not eemsidered substantial evidence
Moreover, immediately after hearing this statement of Dr. Harris,
59. Jeyes, Chamberlain. p. 484.
60. Ibid., p. 485.
61. Ibid.. 486.
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the secretary of State for the Colonies offered himself as a wit¬
ness, and stated what took place at the interview between himself and
certain officials of the colonial office, and representatives of
the British South Afidca Ccanpany with reference to the proposed
transfer of the strip of Bechtiana and concluded by stating:
"I desire to say in the most explicit manner that I had not
then nor had I ever had any knowledge, or until, I think it was
the day before the actual raid took place, the slightest suspicion
of anything in the nature of a hostile or armed invasion of the
Transvaal* The gentlemen who were my colleagues in office. Lord
Selboume, the Under Secretary of State, and Sir Robert Mead will
be ready to speak for themselves. Mr. Fairfield assistant colonial
Secretary is dead. . • . but I say from communication which I have
had with Mr. Fairfield, and with the other gentlemen named,
convinced that they had no more suspicion than I had myself
Another piece of evidence by which his critics sought to prove
that he had previous knowledge of the Raid was the two telegrams
which Chamberlain sent to Sir Hercules Robinson.®® The first one
was sent at 5:30 p. m. on the day of the raid, December 29, 1895.
It read: "It has been suggested, although I do not think it pro¬
bable, that an endeavor migiht be made to force matters at Johannes¬
burg to a head by someone in the sservice of the company advancing
from Beohuanaland.'*®^
Robinson was further instructed, "If necessary, but not other¬
wise, to infona Rhodes that in his Robinson^ opinion such action
would not have the support of Chamberlain.Robinson was also
to remind Rhodes of the articles in the Charter which restricted
annexation. The following day, December 30, 1895, eLfter receiving
62. Ibid.. 487.
63. High Coimnissioner of Cape Colony.
64. Lovell, aontffa. A£rigfi4.^ p.334.
65. Ibid., p. 335.
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a cable from Robinson stating : that the movement in Johannesburg
had collapsed, Chamberlain cabled at 4:30 p. m. "Are you sure
Jameson has not moved in consequence of collapse?”
As to the explanation of the first telegram there are two pos¬
sibilities. According to his own admission. Dr. Harris had told
at least a half dozen people in London of the proposed coup in the
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Transvaal, even as to the date—which was originally the 23rd in¬
stead of the 28th. It is quite conceivable that one of the persons
so Informed might have passed the information bn to Chamberlain.
Following this line of thought Chamberlain might have sought to
cover himself by trying to stop Jameson at the zero hour^ knowing
that it was then too late. Chamberlain himself explains this first
telegram by saying it was due to something Fairfield had read in
a financial paper. This paper, according to F. E. Garrett, editor
of the ”Cape Times”, was the Transvaal National Union's Manifesto,
which was published in the "Cape Times" of December 28. Fairfield
had read the paper and had written to Chamberlain at Biimiingham;
Chamberlain had authorized the cable sent on the 29th. Its hypo¬
thetical form Chamberlain explained by the uncertainty of the in¬
formation. For to have condemned an invasion in advance publicly
would have been an insult to Rhodes.
The second cable speaks for itself, viz: that he had been in¬
formed of the events of the previous day.
If Chamberlain had meant the cable to cover him, merely in
the event of Jameson's failure it would have been wiser for him to




all. On the other hand Basil Williams maintains that the cable
exonerates Chamberlain.
There is one further piece of evidence to be considered. Sir
Graham Bower, Imperial Secretary to the Hi^ Commissioner at Cape¬
town, had positive knowledge of Rhodes' plans at least two weeks
in advance.®® On December 30, at 5:00 a. m. Bower sent Robinson
the following note:
"My dear Sir Hercules:
I hope you will come to town early. There
is I fear, bad news from Jameson. He seems to




In this note Jameson is now called Jameson and it was obvious¬
ly written on the assumption that Robinson will understand what it
means. This assumption Robinson does not deny or explain. The
Inference is that the assumption is true. If Robinson knew of it,
it is natural to suppose that Chamberlain knew of it. Herein lies
the accusation.
But, in spite of the note, Robinson flatly denied any previous
knowledge of the Raid. In substantial proof of this con-
67. Williams, Cecil Rhodes, p. 272.
68w Jeyes, Chamberlain. p. 491.
69. Lovell, South Africa, p. 336.
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tention, it is known that he retained the confidence of President
Kruger throu^out the crisis. If he had failed to prevent the
trouble, he did at least, succeed in reducing it to manageable
proportions. As soon as he had been formally notified of Dr.
Jameson's move, he took unmistakably vigorous measures to stop
them. It was by this act that he was able to gain Kruger's
ear and to an extent shape his policy. The leaders were saved
from the firing squad and presented to the English Government for
trial.'^O
All in all there sdemed to have been good reasons foh the
complete exoneration of Robinson by the Select Committee, He was
absolved of all blame, which in turn cleared Chamberlain of the
suspicion of having been informed by Robinson. According to
Kruger, however, Chamberlain was not only "fully informed" of
Rhodes* plans, but was an active part^ in the direction of those
plans
Be it as it may, the general conclusions of the committee
were summed up in seven paragraphs, the sixth of which read;
"Neither the Secretary of State for the colonies nor any of
the officials of the colonial office received any information
which made them or any one of them aware of the plot during its
development
70, Eric A. Walker, Lord de Vllliers and His Times, South Africa,
1842"1914 (London, I'QSK), p. 26^,
71, Kruger, Memoirs, II, 256-269,
72, Jeyes, Chamberlain, p, 496,
56
Had Lord Carnarvon's policy of confederation succeeded, the
first Boer War would not have occurred* Had Rhodes' policy in
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1895 "been a success the second Boer Y/ar would not have occurred.
Since 1861 the colonial office had maintained a fairly consistent
forward policy in South Afrlca.*^^ As Secretary for the Colonies
in 1895 Chamberlain was far from being an exception to this rule*
He knew just as Carnarvon had known before him that a South Africa
federated tinder the English flag would be a joy to the heart of
every true Britisher* It is quite conceivable that Chamberlain's
heart might have rejoiced at the complete success of Rhodoil bold
stroke *
With this in mind perhaps it would be well to consider cer¬
tain unofficial evidence against Chamberlain before we accept as
gospel truth the verdict rendered by the Select Parliamentary
Commit tee •
There are three points to be considered*
In the first place, when a debate on the report of the Com¬
mittee was forced upon a reluctant House, Chamberlain defended
Rhodes in a speech in which he declared that Rhodes had done nothing
73* Lovell, South Africa, p* 1
74* Prior to 1891 England's interest in South Africa was mainly
humanitarian* She wished merely to keep the Cape in order
t© insure passage to India and her interest in the other parts
of South Africa was in what Carlyle called the "nigger ques¬
tion"* Missionaries like Rev* John Phillip and Rev* John
Mackenzie struggled as only true heroes can, against the want
on exploitation of the natives* Prodded on by public opinion
thus created the colonial office followed a half-hearted zig¬
zag course till 1861, at which time honest imperialism set in*
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which could effect his position as a man of honor. This was
all well and good on the surface, hut,
"it was an open secret that throu^out the debate one
member unconnected with either bench (Rochefort
Maguire presumably) sat with certain telegrams in his
pocket • • « which he bdd instz^otions te readtito the
event of Mr* Rhodes* oharaeter being aspersed."”^
Chamberlain's own e3q>lanation of this incident is given in
a letter he wrote on October 14, 1897, to a Radical member of
the Select Committee, John Ellis, M. P. In the letter he again
asserted that Rhodes* actions were no reflection on his personal
honor. Moreover, he regarded as scandalous the accusations that
Rhodes had been prompted by pecuniary motives**^®
75* Lovell, South Africa, p. 339.
76. i3hamb4riai^;'
"l may tell you that I only decided to speak at
the last moment and then without a note, under an
instinctive feeling that silence would be misunder¬
stood.
I am not able to refer to the exact words, but
I think I said that Rhodes had been guilty of the
greatest political offense of which any man could bo
accused but that this was no ji^lection on his per¬
sonal honor.
I do not know if it was well expressed, but I
know what I meant. I meant that none of those who ac¬
cused him would refuse to meet him at dinner, or be
excluded from a club of which they were members. I
meant that the scandalous accusations of personal and
pecuniary motives which Labouchere and others had made
against him were false, and I thought what I said was
scant reparation for such charges.
One thing more. Have you and others thought what
would be the consequences of driving Rhodes to the wall.
If in his desperation he joined forces with the extreme
Dutch element and took advantage of the British Govern¬
ment, we could hardly keep the Cape Colony without a war.
Is it worth while to risk this for the satisfaction of
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In the second place there were tve telegrams which Rhodes
sent to Miss Flora Shaw, just prior to the Raid, which seem
certainly to suggest, at any rate, that Chamberlain had an idea
as to what was going on*
Both telegrams are here quoted*
’’inform Chamberlain that I shall get through all right, if
he supports me, but he must not send cables like he sent to the
hi^ commissioner in South Africa. Today the crux is I shall
win and South Africa will belong to England*”
^nd again:
"Unless you can make Chamberlain instruct the high commis¬
sioner to proceed at once to Johannesburg, the whole position is
lost. High Commissioner would receive splendid recelptlon and
still turn position to England's disadvantage, but must be in¬
structed by cable Immediately. The instructions must be specific,
*78
as he is weak and will take no responsibility."
depriving Rhodes 'of his barrenrhohov of ; the. Privy
Councillorshlp?
I am thankful to say that affairs in South Africa
give me no anxiety at the present moment * My earnest
hope is that everyone will gorget the existence of the
place for the next year or two, except those who like
myself are responsible more or less for its futux>e--
and oven then we shall have to be very dumb and rather
deaf* " Lovell, South Africa, p. 340*
77. A London newspaperwoman and journalist*
78. Both cables quoted from Kruger, Memoirs. II, p. 258.
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The third poiht is that the British Government laid only
a portion of the telegrams before he Select Parliament a i*y
79
Committee. This omission leads one to at least suspect that
there was some incriminating evidence in them.
In conclusion, therefore, one might be safe in saying that
Chamberlain was innocent of complicity in Rhodes* grandiose scheme
to stage a coup d*etat in the Transvaal. Unofficially, however,
one would be equally safe in sa.ing that there is not only a pos¬
sibility that Chamberlain was in possession of the plana prior
to Sunday, December 29, 1895, but a very definite probability.
Chamberlain realized that If the entire map of South Africa
was done in red, it would mean an immense advance in political
prestige and economic gain. But this was by no means, the end
of the story. Who knows but what the man who gave bonntifuljy
of both time and money to help the poor starving ragamuffins of
Birmingham, did not have in mind the equally humanitarian idea of
alleviating the deplorable exploitation of the Natives? While it
is true that the position of the Native under British rule was not
an enviable one, it was an infinitely more bearable existence than
80
that under the Boers.
Rhodes himself was moved by no humanitarian regard for the
Natives • He probably thought of them as machines with which to
grind out wealth. For example, in the transaction of the
79. Ibid., p. 259.
80. R. L. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa (New York, 1923),
I, 1-201; W. M. Macmillan, Ban'tu Boer land' Britan, (London,
1929), pp. 245-268, 290-318] See also South African Native
Races Committee, editors. South African Natives (New York.
1909).
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Bechunaland strip when Chamberlain became insistent about Native
rights and fair treatment, Rhodes angrily cabled on November 12,
1895, that "you must consider shareholders, ... It is humil¬
iating to be utterly beaten by these niggers they think
ft!
more of one naibive at home than the whole of South Africa."
Rhodes was a successful business man and a consecrated
pire builder; as such he rightly deserves his fame. Chamberlain
was equally given to the furtherance of the British empire, but
his imperialism was modified by an honest desire to give everyone,
even non-whites, a chance to live and be happy. On this was his
South African policy based. Until he became cognizant of the
treatment of the Natives by the Boers he opposed confederations;
afterward, he was a staunch supporter of it. In 1885 he sent the
Warren esqjedition into the Transvaal to uphold British soverignty
and to restore two Bechuanaland chiefs to their positions. His
attitude toward the Natives was consistently benevolent, and if
he were a party to the plan of the Jameson Raid, it may be con¬
jectured that he was seeking to free the Natives from the oppres¬
sive rule of the Boers,
81. Lovell, South Africa, p, 322
CHAPTER IV
Shepstone, Prere, Camavon, and Kimberley
Shepstone
Sir Theophilus Shepstone was bom in the little English
village of Westbury-on-Trim, on January 8, 1817. His father,
the Reverend William Shepstone, emigrated to South Africa in
1820, where he soon became a missionazy under the Wealeyan
Mission Society* Theophilus, the eldest of seven sons, was
educated in the mission schools of Cape Colony and early
gained a remarkable proficiency in Native languages and dia¬
lects, This qualification stood him in good stead in later
life. In January of 1835 ho became chief interpreter of
Kaffir languages at Capetown, That same year ho served on
an expedition against the peoples whose languages he had
learned. He was also a member of the British expedition that
occupied Natal in 1842, For several years ho was British resi¬
dent amon^Tslambl, Congo, and Fingo Tribes, In 1845 Natal be¬
came a separate government, and Shepstone was made the official
agent for the Native tribes. When the constitution was reformed
in 1856, he was made secretary for Native affairs and a member
of botdi legislative and executive committees. In this position
he maintained and staunchly supported a policy of recognizing
Native customs. In the pursuance of this policy ho consistently
condemned attempts to hasten civilization,^
1, D, N, B. XVIII, 65-66.
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Shortly after Lord Carnarvon came into Beaconsfield's
Ministry as Secretary for Colonial Affairs, he decided that
the time "was ripe" for the annexation of the Transvaal*^
The man he commissioned to carry out this policy of annex¬
ation was Sir Theophllus Shepstone. To all appearances his
choice was a wise one, for In addition to possessing diplo¬
matic tact and moral cotirage Shepstone was already "sold"
to the Idea of annexation*
When Shepstone returned to South Africa with the commis¬
sion In his pocket "to annex any territory* • •" the Boer's
feeo* of an uprising of the Zulus under Sekukunl had been dis¬
pelled*^ But there were still certain centrlfrxgal forces at
work within the Boer Republic upon which Shepstone based his
hopes for a peaceful success* For while British officials had
no scruples against using force. It was well known In diplom¬
atic circles that British public opinion would not support
such a method*^ TJys points out that "to conquer the Transvaal
by force of arms would be far too drastic a measure for
John Bull's stomach"* Ho further declares that "only the dread
of British public opinion stayed the hands of the Colonial and
War Office Coterie from dragging the Trojan horse into the
2* Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli, II, 1282*
3* TJys, Shepstone, p* 211* An adequate description of this
war scare is given by TJys pp* 165-212, passim.
4* Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli. II, 1283*
Republic”.®
One of the main causes of dissension within the Republic
was the fact that the Boers had lost confidence in their Pres¬
ident. In the special session which President Burgers called
on Septeniber 4, 1876, the Volkaraad treated him with open dis¬
respect which reflected the utter contempt which they felt for
him.® It was impossible for the country to present a united
front on any question as long as Burgers was president.
Moreover, President Burgers was blamed for the abnormal
conditions of finance. A bond issue had been placed with a
Dutch Banking house for 1:300,000 for the construction of a
railroad to Delagoa Bay. Since only about f:90,000 were taken
up, the plans had been abandoned, and the Volksraad foxtnd it¬
self forced to levy a grievously oppressive tax, which resulted
in a general tmrest and dissatisfaction.'^
Added to this was the Zulu difficulty which might develop
as a result of the Boers* taking the Zulus* land.® The Boers
considered the damage in this direction to be greater than it
5. Uys, aiepstone. p. 225.
6. Ibid., p. 215.
7. Lovell, South Africa, pp. 14-15.
8. The usTial excuse and explanation for the war against Cety-
wayo was that his well-trained army was a menace, but it
must be remembered that the army owed its existence to the
fact that the Boers were constantly encroaching on Zulu
territory. It was to save this territory that the Zulu
kings had raised up this fighting machine.
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was* The immediate cause of dispute was the boundary line*
This was the situation as Shepstone found it in 1876
and he at once decided on the policy of maintaining and fo¬
menting discord within the Republic iidiile at the same time he
kept them confronted with the fear of^Zulu invasion* It was his
hope that this policy would lead to the peaceful acceptance of
British suzerainty by the Boers* Time proved that he was right,
Shepstone’3 first opportunity to advance his policy came
when President Burgers entered the race for renomination*
Shepstone suid his agents supported extraneous contenions and
prolonged controversied in order to gain time and to keep
other candidates out of the field so Itiat Burgers mi^t step
unopposed into the preMdential ohaii> and add further eon<»
9
fusion to the state.
The professed desire on the part of Shepstone, Sir Garnet
Wolseley and Lord Camavon to pr^Sirent Native wars and to
rescue the Boers was a more pretext made necessary by the force
of British public opinion* Quite to the contrary, they de¬
sired war, preferably between a Native tribe and the South
African Republic,Thus it was that Shepstone was keenly
disappointed when he received word that Cetywayo had decided
9* Nys, Shepfctone, p, 230,
10* The general in Command of British troops in South Africa*
11, TJys, Shepstone, p* 22,
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to let matters take their course and not to take up arms
against the Amaswazi.^^ Upon receiving this news Shepstone
drily commented, • The dance of the first fruits is not
yet*"
There were now two more matters that had to be decided
before Shepstone could safely cross the Republican border*
In the first place, necessary military arrangements had to
be made* In this respect Lord Carnarvon had from the very
beginning relied on military power rather than upon the more
dubious weapon of diplomacy* had even wuggested that
Shepstone should, without any ado, march a regiment to Pretoria
and plant the British ensign on the government buildings at
the capital*^® This policy was at least followed in part, for
as General Butler points out, "* * * regimentsf were steadily
pouring into Durban and before long Natal's 'ustial seven com¬
panies swelled into seven battalions'"*^^ As early as
November 23, 1876, Shepstone realized that he wotild require
the backing of troops in order to accomplish his pxirpose. Ho
fully understood that without a strong military force on the
borders of the Republic "his mission was not likely to bear
fruit"*^®
12* A tribe under Boer protection* War against them would have
been tantamount to declaring war against the Boers*
13* Uys, Shepstone. p* 224*
14* Sir William Butler Autobiography. (London, 1911), p* 196*
Cited in Uys, Shepstone. p* 284*
15* Loo, cit*
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The difficult part of the "game", however, was to inarch
troops to Newcastle without giving Cetewayo the Impression
that they were intended for the protection of the Boers against
the Zulus* Lord Carnarvon was particularly Interested In this
phase of the mission#^® He was of the opinion that it would
not be desirable to move soldiers Into the Transvaal unless
and until Shepstone saw his way clear to take)# and proclaim
it.i’
The second matter that Shepstone had to consider was that
of public opinion in the Republic itself* Sentiments had to
be probed and if necessary, fashioned to stilt the needs of
the occasion* In short Shepstone deliberately launched an ex¬
tensive, and Incldently,expensive, campaign of pro-Britli^
propaganda* His most Important agents were Hr* Fred Jeppe,
18
former Postmaster-General of the Republic, Mr* Percy
Whitehead, a land speculator who had once offered to buy the
whole Zulu territory on behalf of Natal, and Mr* J* Henderson,
wealthy father-in-law of George, one of Shepstone's sons*
Mr* Henderson was also the promoter and moving spirit behind
Natal’s railway scheme*^^
These agents were unsuccessful in instilling Into the
Boer mind a dread of the Zulus or In making them think that
16* ^c* clt*. See also Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli. II,
1S86*
17* Uys, Shepstone. p* 225*
18* Following the mysterious disappearance of large qualities
of stamps, Jeppe had been asked to resign*
19* Uys, Shepstone. p* 226*
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Shepstone was coming as tiaelr saviour; but they did succeed
in exciting the Boer curiosity to see the "wonderful old man”*
They were also able to induce the Boers to place their signa¬
tures, in blissful ingnorance, to addresses welcoming the
special commissioner to the Transvaal* Thou^ they did not
know it, these expressions were intended to be used as Jus-
tificajbion for the annexation of the Treuisvaal#'*''
There were nmerous other details which were of prime
importance to the success of Shepstone's mission, but ghovl^
has been said to serve the purpose of this thesis, via: to
show that the annexation was not the result of any spontan¬
eous and voluntary clamor on the part of the Transvalers, but
rather, it was the result of planning campaigning and coercion
on the part of Sir Theophilus Shepstone and his coterie*
On December 20, 1876, Shepstone informed Burgers that he
was on the point of visiting the Transvaal escorted by twenty-
five armed police and seven gentlemen as a special staff* His
avowed object was "to institute a 'special inquiry into the
origin, nat-ure and circ\mistances of the disturbances in the
Transvaal', with a view to securing, if possible, 'the ad¬
justment of existing disputes and difficulties, a settlement
of the questions out of \diich they have arisen and the adoption
of such measxires as may appear best calculated to prevent their
occurence in the future
20* Ibid,. pp* 237-238.
21, Ibid,t p, 242*
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On January 4, 1877, Sir [Eheophilus advanced with his
22
"escort” into the Transvaiil,. He arrived in Pretoria a fort¬
night later. He maneuvered, intrigued, and procrastinated till
the middle of March, By this time he had brought sufficient
pressure to bear on President Burgers to make him openly advocate
the confederation.Volksraad broke with Burgers and not
only passed a reform bill, but it also placed on liie statute
books a law rendering it high treason to invoke a foreig^i
24
power to interfere in tide affairs of the Republic. And
worst of all, for Shepstone’s purposes, Paul Kruger was made
vice-president with powers to call the Volksraad when neces¬
sary. Moreover, a recess had been declared in the raad in
order that the members might "fly to their constituencies"
and ascertain public opii^on in regard to the proposed con¬
federation .
Sir Theophilus had the best of reasons for believing that
the response to stich an appeal would be a thundering chorus
of Nays, but on the other hand he had gone too far to recede
without making prodigious efforts for the constimmation of his
mission. He realized now that he would have to challenge pub¬
lic opinion by the use of force. His next step therefore was
to disarm, as much as possible, those who would have criticisms
to make, and to "take the wind out of the sails of the press"
both in England and South Africa.
22. Ibid., p. 261.
23, Ibid., p, 362, See also Kruger,Memoirs, I, 130-137, passim.
24, Uys, Shepstone. p, 263,
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With an ingenuity that would have done credit to Bismarck
Shepatone inveigled the colonial office into the belief that
”a special- system of terrorism prevailed in the Transvaal,
whioh jpepressed 'every Independe&tLtitteranc», wm in the coun¬
cil chamber* Shepstone wrote a pwrsonal letter to Lord
Carnarvon in which he emphasised the "abject state" of the
partially armed resistance of the radical party; moreover he
pointed out his belief that in two or three weeks all opposition
would have ceased,^®
The stage was now admirably set; the actors were all in
their positions; both the British troops and those of Cetewayo
27
were massed on the borders; the public was expectant, and,
at the psychological instant Shepstone cast aside his actor's
garments by eloquently proclaiming the Transvaal to be British
territory, April 12, 1877,
The day before, Shepstone had written to Lord Carnarvon
explaining and justifying his actions. He ended the letter by
declaring that "all the thinking and intelligent people know
this and will bo thankful to be delivered from the thraldom of
petty factions, by which they are perpotvially kept in a state
of excitement and imrest, because the government and evei*ything
connected with it is a thorou^ sham , ,
Lord Carnarvon accepted tiie letter on its face value. He
passed it on to the press, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone woke
the next morning the most popular man in the Empire,
25, ^ P* 365,.
26, Loc, cit,
27, Walker, South Africa, p. 371, Cetewayo was anxious to help
the British fi^t the Boers,
28, Uys, Shepstone. p, 387,
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Sir Bartle Prere
Bom in the little village of Clydoch in Brecknockshire,
March 29, 1815, Henry Bartle Edward Prere spent the formative
years of his life in the manner usual to the sons of English
coxaitry gentlemen* He graduated with honor fr<mi Halleyburg Col¬
lege in 1834 and obtained a wrltershlp ih the Bombay Civil Ser¬
vice* In 1835 he was appointed assistant to the tax collector
at Poona*^ In this capacity he recommended and obtained a sub¬
stantial reduction in the taxes paid by the Natives*
In 1848, upon the death of the Rajah Shahjl, the British
government ignored the claim of the Rajah's adopted son, and an¬
nexed the territory* The justification for this annexation was
stated by Lord Dalhousie in this wlse| ”the British government
is bound not to put aside or to neglect such opportunities of
acquiring territory or revenue as may frcoi time to time present
themselves"*^ Following the annexation Prere was made hi^ com¬
missioner of the province*
During the "Indian Mutiny" of 1857-1858 Prere won the plaud¬
its of the Government for his conduct of affairs* In 1862 he was
appointed Governor of Bombay* In 1867 having been appointed a
member of the Indian Coimcil, he returned to England where he
was made the recipient of several signal honors*
1. D. N* B. VII, 697*
2* Ibid*. VII, 698*
3. Ibid*. VII, 702*
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In 1877 Sir Bartle Prere was appointed Governor of the
Cape and Ooramissioner for the settlement of Native affairs
In South Africa.^ He arrived In South Africa in early April,
just before Shepstone's proclamation of annexation. The whole
country was in an \inpreoedented state of political tinrest. The
Natives, both the Zulus and the Kaffirs, were about to fight
back against the oppressive Boers®, and the Boers in their turn
woiild have liked to fi^t the British who had massed troops on
their borders.® The general condition of the country was, to
put it mildly, \mstable and indeterminate.
The Amaxosa tribe under their tinforttanate chief, Kreli,
had been deprived of much of their territory by the British.
Much of this land had been “given” to the Pingos who were tinder
British protection. In 1877 the Xosa "not unnaturally came to
blows with their dlspossessors, the Pingos”, and in consdquence
also with the Government. This gave Prere an opportunity fur¬
ther to subject a Ifative tribe. So Kreli, "tall, erect and
splendidly formed” was driven out of the territory of his ances¬
tors, and his people were reduced to unimportance.*^
Prere*s claim to fame (or shame) in connection with South
Africa is the part he played in the Zulu War of 1881. While it
4. Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli, II, 1289.
5. Ibid., II, 1285.
6. TJys, Shepstone. p. 386.
7. Macmillan, Bantu. Boer, and Briton, p. 296.
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is generally agreed liiat he was directly responsible for the
war, there are many who justify his actions* The controversy
warrants at least a brief presentation of the facta.
In 1861 Cetewayo, then a subordinate chief under his father,
had ceded the so-called Blood River territory to the Transvaal
in return for Cetewayo^s two brothers who had escaped to the
8
Transvaal, The Transvaalers were to have paid a stam of money
w 9
for the territory, but this ’’purchase price escaped to Natal ,
and Shepstone refused to deliver the fugitives who had then
fled to Natal also,^^ Thus it was that when Cetewayo became
king in 1872 (at a ceremonyP#J!'fOiTOed by Shepstone himself) he
claimed the Blood River territory since the transaction had been
a unilateral one, Shepstone supported him in his claim, but
when the Transvaal was annexed and became British territory he
changed hia mind about the legitimacy of Cetewayo*s claim and
11
supported the Transvaal, Ihis conduct on the part of Shepstone
naturally caused Cetewayo to consider the expediency of resort¬
ing to arma,^^
It was finally agreed, however, tiiat the question should be
submitted to a commission. This was done, and the commission
8, ITys, Shepstone, p, 84,
9, Walker, South Africa, p, 323,
10, Loo, cit,
11, Lovell, South Africa, p, 21,
12, Walker, South Africa, p; 380,
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awarded the territory to tlie Zulus* It is at this point that
Prere entered the picture* Prere believed that the Native tribes
should bo subjugated to British rule and he followed this policy
consistently* This had been his policy in regard to iiio Natives
of India; so it was with the Natives of South Africa#^® More¬
over, the Zulus held a valuable territo3?y, nAilch, thanks to
Shepstone, was now surrounded by British territory* The Zulus
were a powerful tribe led by a sagacious and cotirageous chief¬
tain* It is quite conceivable that Prere remembered Lord Dal-
housie's imperialistic philosoiihy*^^ Be it as it may, Prere
refused to allow the commission’s decision to be carried out as
it was rendered* With the deliberate pxirpose of forcing Cete-
wayo into war, ’’Prere accepted the boiindary award ’with certain
limitations’” as his biographer, Martineau, puts it*^®
The Boers within the territory were to be compensated upon
eviction or protected by a British resident if they elected to
remain in Zululand* Missionaries were to be protected in like
manner* Reparations were to be made for British grievsinces by
the payment of six hundred cattle and the surrender of certain
individuals* The Zulu army w as to be demobilized and the mil¬
itary system abolished, and, most distasteful of all, Cetewayo
was to receive a British ’’resident” at his capital* These de¬
mands were presented in a thirty-day ultimatum, on December 11,
just eight days after Prere had received the telegraphed summary
13. D* N* B* VII, 697-702, 703, 704, passim*
14* Supra*.IV. p* 70*
15* Lovell, South Africa, p* 23*
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of Hicks-Beach’letter of November 7: ”We cannot have a Zulu
War now"^*^»
In epite of the harsh terms of this dOTiand, and in spite
of the rainy season Cetewayo "set about collecting the repar¬
ations cattle”* On the other hand Prere, with the simple state¬
ment that "the die for peace or war had been cast more than two
years ago", pushed forward military preparations with imtiring
energy* On the appointed day Prere gave the matter over to
General Thesiger "to take such measures as he might deem neces-
H 18
sary *
General Thesinger "deemed it necessary" cross the
Tugela River to carry war to the Zulus* The Zulus met the Brit¬
ish at Isandhlwana and annihilated them* However, the British,
superior in equipment and resources, reversed Isandhlwana at
Ulundi*^® This ended the war and broke the Zulu power forever*^®
The war had cost millions of dollars, it had ccane at a
time when Beaconsfield’s cabinet could ill afford to be crit¬
icized; moreover, it had been undertaken in flagrcuit disregard
of "advice" from the colonial office* In short, Prere had de¬
liberately disobeyed instructions and had embarrassed the Govern¬
ment*
16* Colonial Secretary from January, 1878 to April, 1880*
17* Lovell, South Africa, p* 23* Italics as in the original.
18* Walker, South Africa, p* 380*
19* The battle of Isandhlwana was fought January 22, 1879;
Ulundl, J\ily 4, 1879*
A very limited description of the war is givenln Walker,
South Africa, p* 283; also D. N* B* VII, 704, 705; the
Blood River controversy and Isandhlwana are described at
some length in Thomas J. Lucas, The Zulus*
20*
74 A
OUhe Home Government was Indeed facing a dilemma:
a situation vftilch it met by censuring Sir Bartle ”for his
very forward policy". This action came not as the result
of the human suffering or unmitigated misery which he had
brought about, but because he had failed to secure title pre-
21
vious permission and sanction of the Government.
D. N. B.21, VII, 705
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Lord Carnarvon
Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert, fourth Earl of Carnarvon,
was bom Jime 24, 1831# When only seven years of age he made
a speech at a large public meeting of the Society for the Pre¬
vention of Cruelty to Animals, over which his father presided.
He was appointed to Parliament in 1853 and made his maiden
in the House of Lords January 31, 1854.^
Prom this very beginning Carnarvon's views were conserv¬
ative, but he was conservative in a ^radical” sort of way*
Especially was this true in rega3?d to foreign and colonial
policy. As a youtia he had followed with consuming interest
the colonial extension of the empire, and the whole of his
long political career was chiefly Identified with efforts to
unite the colonies with the mother country in permanent bonds
that should be mutually advantageous* In one of his earliest
speeches in Parliament he suggested that the Government give
a vote of thanks to those colonies which had revealed evidence
of practical sympathy with England during the Crimean War*^
Lord Carnarvon served as Under-seeretai*y for the colonies
in Lord Derby* s second minlstryf In 1866 he Joined Lord Derby's
third ministry as Colonial Secretary*^ Serving in this cap¬
acity, oh February 19, 1867, Carnarvon brought forward in an
1* D. N. B*, IX, 646.
2* Loc* Pit*
3* George Saintsbury. The Earl of Derby .(London. 1892), p. 108*
4. Ibid., pp. 170-171*
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exceedingly able speech in the House of Lords his famous bill
for the confederation of the "British North American Provinces”*
This measure which had for its purpose the uniting of Canada,
Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick into a single federal dominion
under the crown, became law in June, 1867*® This idea of Con¬
federation was not original with Carnarvon, nor did he claim it
to have been* It had been in more or less passive contemplation
since the political upheaval of 1838,® The dominion which
Carnarvon was instrumental in bringing about was ifclpowered to
admit at any subsequent time the other colonies and provinces
of British North America. A constitution and a bicameral leg¬
islature were called into existence* Along with these there
were a number of liberal reforms* The working of the whole plan
has justified Carnarvon's sanguine prophecies*
In Disraeli's conservative cabinet of 1874 Carnarvon was
rt
again given the portfolio of the colonial secretary* One of
his first acts as Secretary for the Colonies was to abolish
5* J* L. Morrison, "The Imperial Ideas of Benjamin Disraeli”,
Canadian Historical Review. Vol. I, p. 272* Cited in
R* Gr. Trotter, Canadian do^ederation^ (London, 1924).,
p* 133. Morrison points out that to Carnarvon, not to
Disraeli, goes the credit for all the conservative energy
in this reorganization of the Empire* See also A* H* U*
Colquhoun, Fathers of the Confederation^(Toronto. 1916),
pp• 123, 133—4•
6. Edward Porritt, Evolution of the Dominion of Canada,
(New York, 1920), pp* 59-2^. See also Sir C* P* Lucas,
editor. Lord Durham* s Report on the Affairs of British
North America- (Oxford. 1912). 3 vols*
7. Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli* II, 627, 628, 629, 632*
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slavery within the Gold Coast Protectorate;® however, his at¬
tention was soon entirely taken up by the Imperial situation
farther South*
Perceiving the ill treatment received by the Natives from
the British and the even more rigorous treatment by the Boers,
Carnarvon detemined to protect and render Justice to the
Natives#® He reversed the sentence which had been passed on
Langalibalele by the Natal Government* Lan^alibalele, Chief
of the Amahlubl, had had two messengers from the Natal Govern¬
ment searched before admitting them to his presence* His rea¬
son was obvious; it was feared that their mission had been his
assassination* For this "affront” to the Natal government,
"war" was declared against the Amahlubl* Many were killed and
Langalibalele was taken prisoner along with "an immense number"
of men and women
The Natal Court passed its decree: "the chief was ban¬
ished for life to Robbln Island, the home of lepers and im¬
beciles* His tribe was broken up; the Natives’ homes were
harrassed, their lands harried, their women and children sum¬
marily expelled from their homes and apprenticed (enslaved)
8* D. N* B*, IX, 647*
9* Ibid*. IX, 648*
10* In gleaning information of this sort from ^diite histor¬
ians one must do much "reading betweenlines"* However,
even Walker, and XJys, both South Africans, admit the in¬
justice in the Langalibalele affair* Walker, South Africa,
pp* 358-64; Uys, Shepstone. pp* 89-101*
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to Europeans; tlielr property confiscated and no less than
1:50,000 the proceeds of captured Heuhl cattle, swelled the
Natal exchequer"0^^ This, then, was the sentence which
Carnarvon reversed In t^lte of the anger of the Natallans
iyad especially of Shepstone*^^
Csumarvon further alleviated the lot of the Natives by
rebelling the lieutenant-governor of Natal, Sir Benjamin Plzxe,
and sending out In his stead Sir Garnet Wolseley^^, vho was
less harsh toward the Natives*
On May 4, 1875, Carnarvon telegraphed Sir Henry Barkley,
governor of Cape Colony, suggesting that he (Barkley) have
representatives of the three English settlements meet with
representatives from the two Independent Dutch republics to
determine collectively and on a tmlform basis their fut\ire
relations with the Natives*^^ He also suggested that a
South African Confederation along the lines of his Canadleui
scheme be discussed* Hoz^over, he asked his friend, J* A*
Froude, who was visiting South Africa at the time, to e:q>laln
to the colonists his personal views* But the Assmably at the
Cape indignantly resented Carnarvon* s proposals as an "unwar¬
ranted interference with their right to independent government"*
11* Hys, Shepstone. p* 91*
12* Walker, South Africa, p • 360* See also TJys, Shepstone.
pp* 91-lUi. passimr"
13* Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli. II, 1285*
14. D* N* B., IX, 648*
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Since Carnarvon soon perceived that the time was not right for the car-
15
rying out of his policy, he let the matter drop temporarily. He then
proposed a South African Conference to meet in London. This also failed
to awaken any enthusiasm.
In spite of the antipathy of the Dutch to British rule, their
experiment in self government was becoming obviously more and more vin-
successful, day by day. The financial distress of the republic was
16
acute. The Dutch "wars" against the Natives were calculated to exterm-
17inate the Native population* All in all, the anarchy of the republic
Yfas a scandal throughout South Africa and constituted a menace to British
interests there. Carnarvon realized this and decided, even in the face
of rebuffs, to embark on his great plan for the confederation of South
18
Africa. This plan he stated to Beaoonsfield on September 15, as fol¬
lows :
"My hope is that by acting at once, we may prevent war and
acquire at a stroke the whole of the Transvaal Republic, after
whichthe Orange Free State will follow, and the whole policy in
South Africa, for which we have been laboring will be fully and
completely justified*
On October 15, 1876, Carnarvon wrote to Beaoonsfield:
"The Progress of events in South Africa seems to bring a
possible annexation of the Transvaal Republic and the consequent
confederation of the various colonies and states within sight . . *
15. Walker, South Africa, p* 565,
16. Lovell, South Africa, p* 14,
17. In spite of the fact that he gives £ui exactly opposite point of
view the facts that Kruger gives in his Memoirs seem to justify
this statement. His T/diole two volumes are full of accoimts of
raids on the Natives, According to his own admission the loss
of life among the Natives was great, (pp. 109) In the same breath
Kruger admits that the hope of acquiring land and cattle as plund¬
er was a dominant factor in these "Native Wars",
18. Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli, II, 1286,
19. Loc^ pit.
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Under these circumstances I am preparing a permissive
bill to allow these colonies and states to confederate.
next step will be without loss of time to bring South Afri¬
can opinion to bear upon it in such a way as to receive some
criticism and expression of feeling on it. If this is, as I
hope, favorable there will be no difficulty in passing the
measure through Parliament .....” 20
Having reached a decision Carnarvon accepted the dubious tes-
21
timony of Froude, and privately empowered Shepstone to annex the
Transvaal "should it refuse to accept confederation."^^
Since the details of the diplomacy on the amexation have
23
been already given, they will not be repeated here. It is sufficient
to repeat that Shepstone annexed the Transvaal April 12, 1877, and that
Carnarvon sent out Sir Bartle Frere to "carry Confederation", which he
failed to do.
After following the personal life and political career of
Lord Carnarvon one can hardly help believing that although his annexa¬
tion failed and fell into disrepute, he had been actuated by lofty mo¬
tives and humane principles. Historically speaking, according to Pro¬
fessor Eric Walker, the Annexation was "excellent in execution, ill-
judged in point of time, wrong in principle and disastrous in its con-
24
sequences.
20. Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli, II, 1287.
21. Froude reported to Carnarvon that public opinion in the Transvaal
was favorable to annexation. vic-;)
22. Uys, Shepstone, p. 181.
23. Supra., Chapter V, pp. 12-0.
24. Lovell, South Africa, p. 16.
Earl Kimberley
John Wodehouse, first Earl of Kimberley, was Secretary
for the colonies in Gladstone's first and second cabinets*
His first administration witnessed the annexation of Griqua-
land west, on October 27, 1871*^ This, however, was due more
to the energetic action of Sir Henry j:^rlCly, hi£di commissioner
to the Cape, than to Kirabeley*® On November 17, 1871, the
British flag was hoisted in the diamond fields and the mush¬
room township was called Kimberley in honor of the colonial
secretary*
Kimberley's second period in the colonial office was not
so fortunate as the first* Kimberley came into office at the
time TBh.en the seeds of discord sown by the annexation of 1877
were about to bear abundant fruit* Moreover, Kimberley was
not particularly interested in colonial affairs, and seems to
have had no convictions as to colonial policy either one way
or the other* He was often "freely credited with want of res¬
olution and of clear ptu^ose"*® In fact he openly admitted
that it was the foreign and not the colonial office, which was
his object in llfe*^ This perhaps helps to explain the fact
that Kimberley acttially played a relatively unimportant role
1* N* B*, Supplement. 1901-1911, p, 696*
2* Walker, South Africa, pp. 322-345, passim,
3* D* N. B*, Supplement. 1901-1911, p* 697*
4* Lord Edmund Pitamaurice, Granville« (London, 1905), I, 180,
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in the politics which shaped the histo2*y of South Africa
dijring his administration as Secretary for the colonies.
Sir Bartle Prere was recalled by a telegram sent by
Kimberley August, 1380, This telegram, however, was not the
work of the colonial secretary; Kimberley was merely the of¬
ficial mouthpiece of ttie office, merely the medium through
5
which the government translated its decisions into actions*
Perhaps on the other hand Kimberley*s irresolution
might have been necessitated by the momentous Importance of
the decisions to be reached: decisions in which the whole
cabinet had to concur* It is quite tmie that it was a crls,
and one that Involved the imperialistic policy of England.
The cabinet met frequently. Perhaps no one man could have
shouldered the responsibilities.
As a general policy the colonial office had given much
consideration to ‘‘advice** from the Cape legislature* This
Cape legislature, backed by President Brand of the Orange Free
State, xirged that a special commissioner be sent to 'inquire
and report", at a moment when the British garrisons were be¬
sieged with no troops to relieve them, and when the news had
just been received of a British defeat,® "Is it not practic¬
ally certain that the Boers would have refused at that time
to have listened to any reasonable terms, * • .”he later wrote*
5* Supra*. Chapter II»"Gladstone"*
6* Morley, Gladstone. Ill, 33*
As a matter of fact, six weeks later, and after continued mil-
itary success the Boers made an overture for peace* On the
face of it, it certainly appears as if Kimberley made a costly
diplomatic blunder, but historically one can only say that it
is one of the IP*S of history*
Even as early as October Kimberley had been infonaed as
to the seriousziess of the sitxxation in South Africa* Frere,
upon his return to England, had called at the Colonial Office,
and had \irged self-government for the Transvaal* Otherwise,
he prophecled, "there will be trouble there"*® But Kimberley
took no action, nor did he urge action upon his colleagues*
Viscount Gladstone suggests that this ml^t have beoi due to
his "*ignorance of Africa, lack of Initiative and habit of pro¬
crastination*" On the other hand, it mi^t have been due to
the fact that Kimberley was impressed with the imperial impor-
t€uice of the Cape, and its strategic location, and therefore
was anxious to retain British supreaatcy in South Africa*®
Following the decision of the Government to accept the
Boer proposal for the appointment of commissioners, Kimberley
communicated with the Boers^®* Once a decision had been
7* Walker, South Africa, p* 389*
8. Lovell, South Africa, p* 29*
9* Roundell Palmer, E^l of Selboume. Uemorials. Personal
and Political, l^gglgis^ (tK>ndon, 189^), II, 6*
10* Walker, South Africa, p* 389*
reached, Kimberley defended the Crovernment both eloquently and
ably, this effect he made a brilliant speech in Parliament
11 12
March 31, and another on July 25. After many techincall-
ties and much weary eloquence, the Pretoria Convention was a-
greed upon and the Transvaal was handed back her independence.
Kimberley attemtpted to get the district of Zoutpansburg set
aeldd as a Native reserve, but he failed to impress the com¬
missioners and the plan was not considered by the convention.
3?hrBe months after Pretoria Convention, Kimberley was t.
transferred to the India Office to succeed Lord Hartlngton,
and with this his contact with South Africa comes t© an end.
11, One^reason^that both the,British and^the Boers were anxious
to bring the war to a close was that they feared the Natives
might take advantage'of the situation and rise against the
whites. Moreover Earl Granville, the Foreign Secretary, was
much impressed by Bismarck*s plea that white men must not
not fight in the stj^t of the tribes, Pitzmaurlce, Granville
II, 229. Also D. N. B, Supplement. 1901-1911, p, 697.
12 Merley, Gladstone, III, 42.
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
After an exaanlnation of British Colonial Policy in South
Africa from 1875 to 1895, the facts seem to indicate that that
policy was shaped by four considerations, viz,, British interests
personal attitude of the statesman, political expediency, and the
element of chance. Each statesman discussed in this thesis was
concerned with each of the four elements given above: it is on
the basis of the extent to which that element influenced action
that the following conclusions are drawn.
The policy of the Earl of Beaconsfield seems to have been
based entirely on Bri ish interests with a wholesome consideration
for political expediency. If he had any personal convictions or
feelings at all in the matter, he successfully subordinated Ihem
to what he must have 1hought to be the more Important considera¬
tion—British interests.
On the other hand Gladstone, who thought of the Negro as a
human but inferior race, was guided by vei*y deep and sincere
personal convictions. When he stood by the pre-Majuba agreement
and later reversed the annexation he was following a very defi¬
nite and honest conviction, but perhaps by so doing he paved the
way for the even more bloody war of 1899-1902.
Chamberlain alone seems to have been honestly interested in
the welfare of the millions of Natives vitoom iircumstances had
85
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placed under the domination of the whites* Chamberlain was
at first opposed to the retention of the Transvaal, but upon
finding how the Boers treated the Natives he at once became
the most zealous champion of retention* British interests
and political expediency entered into his actions, but with¬
out a doubt personal convictions were uppermost* He even ex¬
tended his "honest justice" to the point of humanltarianlsm
in relation to black Natives*
Sir Theophllus Shepstone and Sir Bartle Prere were British
patriots whose sole purpose seems to have been the extension
and preservation of Her Majesty*s authority. The fact that a
few thousands of Bast Indian Natives or South African Natives
had to be sacrificed did not weigh very heavily in their im-
perlalidtlo scales*
In the actions of Camavon political expediency seems to
have been the dcoainating factor* However, the facts seem to
indicate that he also honestly desired to mitigate the lot of
the hapless Natives*
In view of the fact that Kimberley was in dffloe during a
crisis, it is not strange that his actions were guided by politi¬
cal expediency* His only conviction seems to have been that
Britain should maintain supremacy at the Cape as an alternate
route to India in a military crisis.
The year 1875 is often given as the beginning of British
Imperialism. It is certainly true that about this time in
South Africa, Britain began to follow a very definite policy
of expansion* In Britain's defense, it might be said that in
85
the carrying cmt of this policy she pursued a fairly honest
course toward the Natives, Officially, at least, the Natives
were treated with a fair degree of justice. On the other hand,
the Boers dealt justly with the Natives neither officially lior
privately, Olieir Gfcruddwet (constitution) preclftlmed in 1858
and still does proclaim that ”the people will suffer no ©quality
of whites and blacks either in state or in church”,^ llie Boer
policy is merely another proof of the tinith of Oliver Cromwell's
famous statement, "Every sect doth say, 'give me liberty', give
him it and to his dying day ho will deny it to anyone else,"
1. Bryce, Impressions of South Africa. p. 372,
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